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"It is most undesirable that there should be concurrent litigation about the same issues
in two different jurisdictions."1
There was a time when the statement above was likely to come from a U.S. judge
advocating a U.S. forum rather than an English appellate court judge lamenting the
predicament of being unable to dismiss or stay English proceedings in favor of a Texas
forum under European law. Nevertheless, increasing globalization of trade has multiplied
both the number of parallel proceedings and the number of countries whose courts are
facing the challenges of concurrent jurisdiction. Some of the most significant opinions
during the past year addressing multiple proceedings are in cases decided in connection
with proceedings before the European Court of Justice (ECJ).2 The case law from Europe
reflects an effort to address the structural relationship both of proceedings involving the
Member States and proceedings involving nonmember states.' In addition, the past year
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1. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Cellstar Corp., 2003 I.L.Pr. 22, at *394-95.
2. Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT SrI, 2003 E.C.R. -, Celex No.602J0116; Turner v.
Grovit, 1 W.L.R. 107 (H.L. 2001), preliminary reference made, Case C-159/02, 2003 E.C.R. -, Celex No.
602C0159; Owusu v. Jackson, 12002] EWCA Civ 877, preliminary reference made, Case C-281/02, 2003 E.C.R.
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3. The Universite Libre de Bruxelles has been conducting a study on the relationship of the European
Judicial Area to third countries. The project is under the direction of Prof. Arnaud Nuyts. The final report
will be published by Bruylant Press in 2004.
303
304 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
saw substantial progress on a limited judgments convention at The Hague Conference
that includes a lispendens-like priority provision, 4 as well as continued work on the Amer-
ican Law Institute's International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project. Although the de-
tails of these undertakings are beyond the scope of the present article, these efforts give
rise to a hope that procedural responses both here and abroad may help tame the "traf-
ficking" in multiple proceedings.
B. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS IN CYBERSPACE
Multiple lawsuits involving the Internet continue to pose significant problems,5 particu-
larly in terms of prescriptive jurisdiction and especially in defamation and trademark-related
cases. There is an increasing likelihood of litigation seeking to enforce local domestic laws
on foreign-based websites, along with reactive litigation to enjoin the proceeding or the
enforcement of any order. As long as there are no internationally agreed upon norms for
conduct and control of cyberspace, the underlying problem of concurrent jurisdiction will
continue to spawn parallel proceedings.
Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd.6 illustrates a problem of concurrent jurisdiction that
arose from a clash of culture and tradition of a non-serious nature, April Fool's Day. Har-
rods, as part of the English tradition of April Fool's stunts, issued a press release on March
31, 2002, suggesting that it planned to "float" Harrods and advising that a website an-
nouncement would be made on April 1. As it turned out, the April 1 announcement revealed
the matter to be a prank, offering shares in a venture to build a branch of the store as a
moored ship.' Unfortunately, Dow Jones did not wait to see the website offering. Instead,
it assumed that "floating shares" was a reference to a public offering and published a story
to that effect both in the hardcopy and on-line versions of The Wall Street Journal. When
The Wall Street Journal learned of its mistake, it printed a correction and, three days later,
another story in both the print and online versions entitled, "The Enron of Britain," in
which it suggested that if Harrods ever were to go public, "investors would be wise to
question its every disclosure."' As the federal district court described the next portion of
the tale: "[a]t this point the lawyers entered. Promptly the face of comedy began to furrow
and its smile to curl into what often becomes tragedy's first sour frowns and snarls: incipient
litigation." Harrods, offended by the "Enron" reference, wrote to The Wall Street Journal
demanding an apology and correction in domestic and international editions as well as
payment for the damage to its reputation worldwide.
After an exchange of letters between the attorneys, Harrods' solicitors in London wrote
on May 13, 2002, seeking "pre-action disclosure" of information in preparation for filing
a defamation suit in the United Kingdom.1° In response, DowJones filed first on May 24,
4. The draft text of the Convention is available on the Hague Conference's website at http://www.hcch.net/
e/ (last visited May 25, 2004).
5. See Louise Ellen Teitz, Parallel Proceedings. Moving Into Cyberspace, 35 IN-r'L LAw. 491 (2001). See, e.g.,
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The
Yahoo! case was argued before the Ninth Circuit in December 2002 and as this article goes to press an opinion
has yet to be issued.
6. 237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
7. The contact person for this venture was Loof Lirpa, or "April Fool" spelled backwards.
8. DowJones, 237 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400 n.5.
9. Id. at 401.
10. Id. at 402.
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2002, in federal court in New York for a declaratory judgment and an injunction preventing
Harrods from pursuing any defamation claims in the United Kingdom. The stated need
for a declaratory action by DowJones was based in part on claimed differences in English
and U.S. defamation law and burdens of proof. Harrods' response was to initiate its own
suit, one for defamation, in London on May 29, 2002, against The Wall Street Journal.
The U.S. district court's opinion of over sixty pages focuses on the propriety of using
the Declaratory Judgment Act and the lack of actual controversy or ripeness, since Dow
Jones was seeking a prior determination of non-enforceability of any judgment obtained
anywhere against it. Dow Jones argued that without injunctive relief, it could be sued any-
where that the online version was available. After detailing extensive case law on declaratory
judgments, antisuit injunctions, and comity, in the highest of high-toned prose, the court
ultimately dismissed the claim against Harrods.
In the context of private litigation among commercial entities with no significant First
Amendment issues and no conflicting antisuit injunctions, the district court's full-blown
comity discussion seems overdone and, indeed, in affirming the district court's decision,
the Second Circuit found no need to reach the comity issues." While the implications of
conflicting litigation and conflicting prescriptive jurisdiction are inherent in the factual
background, it barely seems to warrant the district court's broad pronouncements of the
magnitude of the Yahoo! litigation.
Cyberspace has also generated parallel proceedings this past year in the realm of trade-
mark and domain names. These cases are the creation and byproduct of the Internet. 2
Before the Internet, the scope of a trade name was limited usually to the geographic area
near where the mark was in use, or at most extended to the national level. But the Internet
and "Google" searches know no national borders, and so new technology has made it
possible to have confusion in trade names and trademarks not previously possible in a bricks-
and-mortar world."3 The confusion in trademark and intellectual property rights is exac-
erbated by the multiple regulations concerning the use and registration of domain names
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
ICANN provides its own mandatory Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP) for certain types of claims, generally described as "cybersquatting" or bad faith
registration of a domain name.' 4 Although ICANN and its authorized dispute resolution
providers are not part of a court system, the UDRP procedure provides yet another poten-
tial for parallel and inconsistent proceedings. This possibility is especially true since the
United States has enacted its own independent statute concerning cybersquatting, the Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),1" which provides for federal court subject
matter jurisdiction and damages. Since a court is not bound by any ICANN determination, 6
there is the distinct possibility of having two inconsistent results. Indeed, the Second Circuit
has noted that "[u]nlike traditional binding arbitration proceedings, UDRP proceedings
11. DowJones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
12. See Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 921-23 (D. Or. 1999).
13. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003).
14. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available at www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/
policy.htm (last visited May 25, 2004).
15. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Sta. 1501 (1999).
16. UDRP T 4(k): "The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 shall
not prevent.., the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for indepen-
dent resolution." Available at www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited May 25, 2004).
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are structured specifically to permit the domain-name registrant two bites at the apple." 7
The result of the ICANN process is generally self-executing in that the domain name is
transferred. On the other hand, the U.S. case law developing in connection with domain
name registration treats the registration as a "res," located at the place of the domain name
registry which in the United States has generally been Virginia. Thus, the current system
allows for the possibility of two different "sovereigns," two different standards, two different
remedies, and two different results, all raising issues of parallel proceedings." 8
A recent lower court case from the Fourth Circuit, GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsan-
tefe.com, 19 illustrates the extent of the multiple proceedings problem within the context of
cybersquatting litigation. The case involved an action against the domain holder of "glob-
alsantafe.com," a Korean entity who registered the domain name with a Korean registrar,
Hangang Systems, Inc. Less than one day earlier, Global Marine Inc. and Santa Fe Inter-
national Corp., trademark holders of their respective names, announced a planned merger
to create a new company known as GlobalSantaFe Corporation. These U.S. corporations
subsequently filed suit in Virginia under the ACPA,20 claiming that the registration by
Hangang infringed their trademark, and seeking to have the domain name transferred to
them. The sole basis for the U.S. court's jurisdiction was the in rem jurisdiction over the
domain name provided for by the ACPA, in this case the location of VeriSign Global Reg-
istry Services, the registry for ".com" top-level domain names.'
On the merits of the case, the U.S. companies prevailed and obtained a judgment di-
recting Hangang to transfer the name to GlobalSantaFe. The Korean domain name holder,
however, did not accept the jurisdiction of the Virginia court over the domain name, and
filed an application in Korea seeking to enjoin Hangang from transferring the domain name
pursuant to the U.S. court order. The Korean court granted the injunction several months
later, finding that the Virginia federal court did not have jurisdiction. In light of the Korean
court's injunction, GlobalSantaFe returned to the Virginia court, this time to ask the court
to order the registry for top-level domain names, VeriSign, to cancel the domain name.
Like many parallel proceedings, the conflicting actions of the two courts raised the possi-
bility of two conflicting orders, one from the Korean court ordering Hangang not to trans-
fer the domain name, and one from the U.S. court ordering VeriSign to cancel the domain
name.
Unlike many contemporary parallel proceedings sagas, the U.S. district court's opinion
considered the international comity implications and issues of abstaining or deferring to
the Korean action. The court relied on the Princess Lida doctrine, a domestic doctrine
derived from a 1939 Supreme Court case, establishing a straight first-in-time rule for ju-
risdiction in in rem cases .2 Here, since the trademark holders had won the race for the res
17. Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 381 (2d Cir. 2003).
18. See, e.g., Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir.
2003) (no deference to UDRP decision); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2003) (de novo
review).
19. 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2).
21. The district court recognized that the in rem character of its jurisdiction under the ACPA meant that
there might be situations in which U.S. courts would have no basis for jurisdiction or no ability to cancel a
domain name's registration, such as where the registry of the domain name was outside of the United States.
GlobalSantaFe Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 623-24.
22. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
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(domain name) and brought suit first in Virginia, the court decided that it would be inap-
propriate to recognize the later-issued foreign court order. The court gave lip service to an
obligation to consider the issue of international comity, but ultimately decided that comity
was not required in the case because: (1) it only applies to "current" proceedings and in the
proceedings at hand a judgment had already been entered; (2) the Korean action was de-
liberately designed to block the U.S. action; and (3) as a forum, the Eastern District of
Virginia had a significant interest in protecting its own trademark holders' rights. In the
end, the court determined that refusing to abstain buttressed public policy concerns of U.S.
trademark law.
C. PARALLEL DIscovERY AND THE FIRST CIRCUIT
When one thinks of obtaining discovery abroad, one usually does not think of antisuit
injunctions. Yet, that is precisely what was involved in a recent securities fraud class action
litigation against the accounting firm KPMG. Although it had not previously aligned itself
with either the strict or lax (liberal) approach for antisuit injunctions,23 in Quaak v. Klyn-
veldpeat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren,2 4 the First Circuit endorsed the "strict" ap-
proach, although with some reservations.
In the case, investors sued KPMG and its Belgium office, KPMG-Belgium, in federal
court in Massachusetts. In the course of discovery, the district court ordered production by
December 1, 2003, of audit work papers held by KPMG-Belgium. Rather than seeking
review of the discovery order in the United States, KPMG-Belgium instead went into
Belgian court three days before the documents were to be produced. Thus, on November
27, Thanksgiving Day, it sought an exparte order from a Belgian court to enjoin plaintiffs
from enforcing the U.S. discovery order, and attaching a significant penalty of one million
Euros against each plaintiff that attempted to enforce the U.S. order. The Belgian court
denied the ex parte application but scheduled a hearing for December 16, 2003.
On December 1, when the documents were to have been produced under the U.S. court's
order, KPMG-Belgium instead provided the plaintiffs with a fax of the motion it had filed
in Belgium three days before. The plaintiffs, obviously not happy with this turn of events,
then sought their own antisuit injunction in the U.S. court. Relying on Laker,2" the
23. Federal courts in the U.S. deciding whether to enjoin parallel proceedings in foreign forums generally
divide into two camps: those such as the D.C., Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits that follow the "sparingly
used" approach of Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and
those that use the more liberal approach of the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Under both approaches,
assuming that the suits involve the same parties and that the resolution of the case in the enjoining court would
be dispositive of the action being enjoined, courts look to see if there is an exception to the general rule favoring
concurrent litigation. The Laker approach recognizes exceptions when the injunction is necessary: (1) to protect
the enjoining court's jurisdiction; or (2) to protect important public policy of the forum. "[D]uplication of
parties and issues alone is not sufficient to justify the issuance of an antisuit injunction." Id. at 928 (footnote
omitted). The liberal standard accords less weight to comity and more to whether the litigation is vexatious or
would result in "inequitable hardship" and lead to delays in the swift and effective adjudication of the action.
For a thorough discussion of the two approaches to antisuit injunctions, see generally George Bermann, The
Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589 (1990); Note, Antisuit
Injunctions and International Comity, 71 VA. L. REv. 1039 (1985). See generally Louise Ellen Teitz, TRAsSNAT'L
LrrIr. 233-50 (1996).
24. In re Lernout & Hauspie Secs. Litig, 2003 WL 22964378 (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2003), aff'd sub. nom.,
Quaak v. Klynveldpeat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cit. 2004).
25. Laker, 731 F.2d at 909.
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Massachusetts federal court looked at the equitable aspects of the traditional tests for in-
junctive relief and found that KPMG-Belgium had never contested jurisdiction and that
the plaintiffs would face irreparable injury from the Belgian injunctive action. The court
further rejected KPMG-Belgium's primary argument that it would face criminal penalties
in Belgium if it turned over allegedly confidential documents. Ultimately, the court rejected
KPMG-Belgium's claim that it was unable to comply as a pretext and found that the plain-
tiffs had made alternate efforts to obtain the documents, even becoming civil claimants in
criminal actions in Belgium.
On appeal, the First Circuit, reviewing for abuse of discretion, articulated its own stan-
dard for granting an antisuit injunction, focusing on the standards set forth in Laker and
emphasizing that it did not view Laker as creating only two bases for injunctions, but rather
an analysis that heavily emphasized comity. Accordingly, the First Circuit found that there
was an "enduring need for a presumption-albeit a rebuttable one-against the issuance of
international antisuit injunctions."2 6
Applying this balance, the First Circuit found that the district court's injunction, to
protect its jurisdiction, was necessary and equitable under the circumstances. The court
stated: "In this case, the district court acted defensively to protect its own authority from
an interdictory strike and we are confident that, in doing so, the court kept the balance
steady and true."" Thus, granting the antisuit injunction here reinforced an approach
stressing a comity-based analysis-not only in granting injunctions, but also throughout
the discovery process and the entire proceeding-and reflects a recent trend towards ac-
knowledging the need for the respect of other legal systems.
D. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS AND ARBITRATION
The problem of parallel proceedings within the context of arbitration, an area of increas-
ing friction, received attention in Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi Negara.28 The Fifth Circuit, although aligned with the "lax" standard for granting
antisuit injunctions, squarely deferred to principles of comity and reversed a district court's
preliminary injunction prohibiting further action in Indonesia to annul a Swiss arbitral
award against Pertamina, an energy company wholly owned by the Indonesian government.
The case in the United States began when the plaintiff, Karaha Bodas (KBC), sought to
enforce the Swiss arbitral award in a federal court in Texas under the New York Conven-
tion.29 At the time that KBC sought enforcement in the United States the Swiss award was
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Switzerland and was subsequently dismissed. The U.S.
district court rejected the defendants' arguments and ordered enforcement in December
2001, allowing execution in light of Pertamina's refusal to post a supersedeas bond pending
appeal. Subsequently, in March 2002, Pertamina filed suit in Jakarta to annul the award
and, in addition, to enjoin KBC from seeking to enforce the award. In response, prior to a
hearing set in Jakarta, KBC sought an order in the United States to restrain Pertamina
from continuing to seek injunctive relief in Indonesia as part of the annulment process.
26. Id. at 18-19.
27. Id. at 29.
28. 335 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2003).
29. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997.
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The U.S. district court granted the order "to preserve the integrity of its judgment... and
(2) to maintain the parties' positions."30
On review, the Fifth Circuit set aside the antisuit injunction. The court balanced "do-
mestic judicial interests against concerns of international comity,"3 noting that "notions of
comity do not wholly dominate our analysis to the exclusion of these other concerns." 32
The Fifth Circuit, which had previously aligned itself with the "liberal" standard for grant-
ing antisuit injunctions, 3 indicated three factors that it would consider in deciding whether
litigation is sufficiently vexatious or oppressive to support the grant of an injunction:
"(1) 'inequitable hardship' resulting from the foreign suit; (2) the foreign suit's ability to
'frustrate and delay the speedy and efficient determination of the cause'; and (3) the extent
to which the foreign suit is duplicitous of the litigation in the United States.""
4
The Fifth Circuit's decision is particularly interesting in its discussion of the "structural
aspects" of the New York Convention which the court suggested contemplate simultaneous
actions to enforce and annul. "In short, multiple judicial proceedings on the same legal
issues are characteristic of the confirmation and enforcement of international arbitral awards
under the Convention."" Based on this, the court found no inequitable hardship on KBC
by allowing the proceedings in Indonesia to proceed and also found that the potential for
financial hardship from fines that might be imposed on KBC was unclear."6 The court
further found an annulment by the court in Indonesia would preclude subsequent enforce-
ment in the United States. Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that there was no threat to the
U.S. court's jurisdiction, nor any possibility of improper, rather than inherent, duplication
of proceedings because of the Convention's structure.
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit carefully addressed the international comity aspects
raised by enjoining judicial proceedings of another sovereign. It balanced these concerns
against the structure of the New York Convention and its apparent embrace of the possible
re-litigation of confirmation and enforcement proceedings. In a clear nod to comity, the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the potential negative impact on U.S. treaty relations by grant-
ing an antisuit injunction, as opposed to simply enforcing an award. The court stated: "In
sum, an injunction here is likely to have the practical effect of showing a lack of mutual
respect for the judicial proceedings of other sovereign nations and to demonstrate an as-
sertion of authority not contemplated by the New York Convention."" Thus, in Karaba
Bodas, the Fifth Circuit, usually more willing than many courts to grant antisuit injunctions,
chose to exercise exceptional deference to the foreign proceedings, relying on the inter-
30. 335 F.3d at 362.
31. Id. at 366.
32. Id.
33. MacPhail v. Oceaneering Int'l, Inc., 302 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2002); Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d
624 (5th Cir. 1996).
34. Karaba Bodas Co., 335 F.3d at 366 (internal citations omitted).
35. Id. at 368.
36. In this connection, the court found:
Nevertheless, as a court of secondary jurisdiction under the New York Convention, charged only with
enforcing or refusing to enforce a foreign arbitral award, it is not the district court's burden or ours
to protect KBC from all the legal hardships it might undergo in a foreign country as a result of this
foreign arbitration or the international commercial dispute that spawned it.
Id. at 369.
37. Id. at 373.
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national nature of the arbitration and litigation, the "secondary jurisdiction" aspect of an
enforcement proceeding, and,no doubt,the sovereign nature of the defendant.
Pertamina's actions in Indonesia, even if spurious, are less vexatious and oppressive than
they would be outside of this treaty structure. Finally, given the absence of a practical,
positive effect that any injunction could have, more weighty considerations of comity dictate
that the better course for U.S. courts to follow is to avoid the appearance of reaching out
to interfere with the judicial proceedings in another country and to avoid stepping too far
outside its limited role under the Convention. 38
In sum, the Fifth Circuit in Karaha Bodas established a strong threshold for a party to
obtain an antisuit injunction in connection with arbitral proceedings under the New York
Convention. The case provides a thoughtful analysis that considers the unique structure of
parallel arbitration and litigation proceedings. The court is to be applauded, in particular
for addressing the problem without reliance on purely domestic precedent.
E. CASEs FROM ACROss THE POND
During the last two years, there have been several cases in Europe that have involved
issues of parallel proceedings. Four cases currently before or recently decided by the ECJ
reflect the problems that have arisen from increased judicial cooperation under the Brussels
Regulation. Specifically, difficulties have arisen from attempts to integrate into European
law the common-law doctrines of antisuit injunctions andforum non conveniens.39 Both the
Brussels Regulation and its predecessor, the Brussels Convention, contain lis pendens pro-
visions- under which, in cases involving courts of different Member States, "any court other
than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the
jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. '4 "Where the jurisdiction of the court
first seised is established any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction
in favour of that court.
42
1. Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl
The strict first-in-time approach under the Brussels Regulation was challenged and up-
held in a case decided this year by the ECJ when one of the parties filed suit contrary to a
choice-of-court clause in a country where the legal proceedings were exceptionally slow. In
Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl,43 Gasser, an Austrian clothing company, sold clothes to
an Italian company, with invoices containing an exclusive choice-of-jurisdiction clause for
an Austrian court. Following a dispute between the parties, the Italian buyer brought suit
first in Rome seeking a declaration that the contract had been terminated and also seeking
damages. Gasser subsequently brought suit in Austria under the forum selection clause for
payment on the outstanding invoices. The Austrian court, on its own motion, stayed pro-
ceedings under the then Brussels Convention article 2 1. Reference was made to the ECJ
38. Id. at 374.
39. For a discussion of antisuit injunctions and the Brussels Convention/Regulation, see Clare Ambrose, Can
Anti-Suit Injunctions Survive European Community Law?, 52 .2 Ir'L & CoMp. L.Q. 401 (April 2003).
40. Brussels Regulation, arts. 27-30.
41. Id. art. 27(l).
42. Id. art. 27(2).
43. Case 116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl., 2003 E.C.R. .
VOL. 38, NO. 2
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS & DISPUTES 311
for a ruling whether the Austrian court was required to stay all proceedings and wait until
the Italian court had declared that it had no jurisdiction under article 2 1 because of the
exclusive Austrian choice of court clause.
Before the ECJ, Gasser and the U.K. government argued that article 2 1 of the Brussels
Convention should be interpreted as meaning that where the second court seised has ex-
clusive jurisdiction under a choice-of-jurisdiction clause, it may, by way of derogation from
article 2 1, give judgment in the case without waiting for a declaration from the court first
seised that it had no jurisdiction. Gasser and the U.K. government argued that choice-of-
court clauses should be encouraged since they "contribute to legal certainty in commercial
relationships."- For this reason derogation from the normal process of waiting for the court
first seised should be permitted. The ECJ rejected these arguments, focusing instead on
the "legal certainty sought by the Convention" and the need to avoid possibly irreconcilable
judgments between the courts of the Member States. The ECJ also rejected the U.K.
government's arguments about the possibility for abuse through the deliberate filing of
litigation in the wrong forum in order to delay the proceedings.
Finally, the ECJ addressed Gasser's and the U.K. government's argument that the pro-
visions of article 21 should not apply because proceedings in the court first seised-Italy-
were alleged to take an "excessively long" time to resolve. Even though the ECJ accepted
the admissibility of the argument, it rejected it out of hand on the merits. The ECJ held
that "[ilt is not compatible with the philosophy and the objectives of the Brussels Conven-
tion for national courts to be under an obligation to respect rules on lispendens only if they
consider that the court first seised will give judgment within a reasonable period." 4
In the end, Gasser suggests a wide potential for abuse by parties that deliberately ignore
a choice-of-court clause. Contrary to the ECJ's laudatory comments about certainty, the
decision in Gasser has the potential to nullify the value of an exclusive choice-of-court clause
by making certainty the captive of procedural maneuvers. In the end, the fastest runner to
the courthouse may well triumph over party autonomy.
2. Turner v. Grovit
Currently pending before the ECJ is another case considering the implications for Eu-
ropean law of parallel proceedings in two Member States. The question raised in Turner v.
Grovit6 concerns the use of an antisuit injunction to stop proceedings filed or threatened
to be filed in another Member State when the defendants are alleged to be acting "in bad
faith with the intent and purpose of frustrating or obstructing proceedings properly before
the English courts."47 The case highlights fundamental differences in the treatment of par-
allel proceedings in certain circumstances in common law and civil law countries.
44. Id. 131. The UK, Government suggested:
[The Court should recognise an exception to Article 21 whereby the court second seised would be
entitled to examine the jurisdiction of the court first seised where (1) the claimant has brought pro-
ceedings in bad faith before a court without jurisdiction for the purpose of blocking proceedings before
the courts of another Contracting State which enjoy jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention and
(2) the court first seised has not decided the question of its jurisdiction within a reasonable time."
Id. 163.
45. Gasser, 2003 E.C.R. 119 68-72.
46. Turner v. Grovit, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 216, preliminary reference made, Case 159/02, 2003 E.C.R..
47. Id.
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Turner, a British national, went to work in Spain. Following an employment dispute, he
asked to terminate the contract and returned to London, where he brought an action for
a form of unfair dismissal in the Employment Tribunal, London. Meanwhile, however, the
employer had instituted proceedings in Spain seeking damages against Turner. Turner asked
the English High Court to issue an antisuit injunction against the defendants from contin-
uing the proceedings in Spain. The English court issued the injunction for a short period
of time, but refused to renew the order. Turner then sought and received an injunction
from the English Court of Appeal, which viewed the proceedings in Spain as being for the
sole purpose of intimidating Turner and therefore an abuse of process warranting injunctive
relief. The House of Lords referred the matter to the ECJ in December 2001 to determine
if the antisuit injunction was inconsistent with the Brussels Convention. The defendants,
as well as the German and Italian governments, have urged that the antisuit injunction is
irreconcilable with the Brussels Convention.
Although the ECJ has yet to rule on the House of Lords' question, the Advocate General
in the case issued a preliminary opinion, 48 finding that the Convention "must be interpreted
as precluding the judicial authorities of a Contracting State from issuing orders to litigants
restraining them from commencing or continuing proceedings before judicial authorities
of other Contracting States. '49 In reaching this result, which reinforces the ispendens pro-
visions of the Brussels Convention in favor of the court first seised, the Advocate General
made reference to case law in other common law jurisdictions, including the United States,
and suggested that the Convention's structure does not allow for antisuit injunctions. 0
Although the Advocate General's opinion is not binding on the full court, if this inter-
pretation is followed in the ECJ's final opinion then there will be no room left for national
law to continue, at least where the proceedings are in two Member States. The result of a
strong lis pendens policy would, along with Gasser, increase the pressure to be the first to
file as well as to encourage vexations filings to wrest jurisdiction away from the otherwise
natural forum.
3. Owusu v. Jackson
Owusu v. Jackson,51 another case for a preliminary ruling currently pending before the
ECJ, raises the question of the continued viability of the common law doctrine of forum
non conveniens under the Brussels regime. The issue before the ECJ in Owusu is the rela-
tionship of the Brussels Convention/Regulation to suits involving third countries. In Owusu,
only one of the defendants is from a Member State; the other five are domiciled in Jamaica.
According to the facts alleged, Owusu, an English domiciliary, was injured at the beach
while on vacation in Jamaica. He brought suit in tort in England against multiple parties,
all but one of whom were Jamaican limited liability companies, for failing to warn of dangers
of a submerged sand bank. He also brought suit for breach of contract against the English
company from whom he rented the villa. The English lower court judge found thatJamaica
was the appropriate forum for the proceedings for several reasons, and that but for the
effect of the Brussels Convention precluding a stay against the one English defendant, he
48. The Advocate General issued an opinion on November 20, 2003. Id.
49. Id. T 38.
50. Id. 30-31 (remarking that European judicial cooperation "is imbued with the concept of mutual
trust").
51. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2003 E.C.R. .
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would have stayed the action in favor of a Jamaican forum. Nevertheless, because he could
not stay the suit against the English defendant, the judge refused to issue a stay as to the
other defendants as well in order to avoid the possibility of parallel proceedings in two
different courts: one in England and one in Jamaica.
The lower court's decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal which subsequently made
reference to the ECJ asking whether, under article 2 of the Brussels Convention, a national
court retains discretionary power under provisions of its national law to decline to hear
proceedings brought against a person domiciled in the national court's state in favor of the
courts of a nonmember state. The English court, in referring the matter to the ECJ, rec-
ognized that the issue offirum non conveniens and the relationship to mandatory provisions
of the Brussels Convention/Regulation as applied to defendants from nonmember states
inherently raises the potential of parallel proceedings and the issue of what response is
permissible, at least when courts of third countries are involved.
The ECJ has yet to act in Owusu, but its decision will no doubt affect parallel proceedings
issues, either indirectly through the application offirum non conveniens, or directly through
lis pendens, for those actions that involve a Member State that under its national law allows
discretionary dismissals or antisuit injunctions-the United Kingdom and a third country.
4. American Motorist Insurance Co. v. Cellstar Corp.
A reference to the ECJ has also been made concerning a related issue of forum non
conveniens in a case where the other forum, indeed the one that the English court believes
is the most appropriate, is Texas. American Motorist Insurance Co. (AMICO) v. Cellstar Corp."
illustrates how European law is now having a direct impact on U.S. corporations that have
foreign subsidiaries and do business abroad. In this case, the issue before the ECJ is whether
the English court's discretion to dismiss is limited by the Brussels Convention/Regulation
since one of the two defendants is a U.K. subsidiary of a U.S.-based company.
Cellstar, a U.S. corporation with its principal place of business in Texas, obtained an
insurance policy from AMICO, an Illinois insurance company doing business in Texas. The
insurance policy was to cover Cellstar's global business of providing wireless communica-
tion equipment through subsidiaries. The insurance policy for "global transportation," is-
sued by AMICO's Texas office, was to cover Cellstar and its subsidiaries worldwide against
losses of cell phones in transit. The litigation in England relates to a claim for approximately
one million pounds for a loss arising out of shipments made by Cellstar's U.K. subsidiary
(CUK) to other locations in Europe. After AMICO denied coverage, demand was made by
CUK and Cellstar in the United States. AMICO, in response, filed suit in London a week
later for a negative declaration against CUK and Cellstar. Cellstar subsequently filed suit in
Dallas against AMICO for wrongful failure to settle the claim, eventually joining other in-
cidents of loss as well. AMICO did not seek to stay the Texas litigation, which would probably
not have been granted, but eventually joined CUK as a third party in the Texas suit.
In the U.K. litigation for a negative declaration of non-liability, AMICO sought to have
Cellstar joined as a necessary party and claimed that the worldwide insurance policy was
governed by English law. By suing CUK, the U.K. subsidiary, AMICO sought to obtain
jurisdiction in England under the Brussels Convention/Regulation for a case involving an
insurance policy issued in Texas by a Texas insurer to a Texas corporation to cover its foreign
52. Amico v. Cellstar, 2003 I.L.Pr. 22.
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subsidiaries. On this basis, the lower court in the United Kingdom, after determining that
English law would not govern the insurance policy, found that Texas was the appropriate
forum for the resolution of the dispute and stayed the action against CUK. AMICO duly
appealed and argued that the lower court had no authority under the Brussels Convention/
Regulation to exercise discretion and stay the action against CUK. Thus, the Court of
Appeal was faced with an issue similar to that in Owusu: whether an action in a Member
State may be stayed in favor of an action in a third country which is the forum conveniens
in light of the mandatory terms of the Brussels Convention/Regulation, establishing the
venue where an English domiciled corporation may be sued. Since it was arguable that the
Brussels Convention did not permit such a stay, the Court of Appeal referred the matter
to the ECJ.
Although the case is a continent away, the implications are significant for U.S. com-
panies with foreign subsidiaries in Europe who may find themselves litigating in several
fora. When one combines the ability to seek negative declaratory actions with the lis
pendens provisions of the Brussels Convention/Regulation and the possible loss under the
Convention/Regulation of the discretionary ability to dismiss in favor of foreign litigation
in a more appropriate forum, one may find that the result is multiple proceedings. Al-
though the insurance contract was to cover losses in Europe and of foreign subsidiaries,
Cellstar would not necessarily anticipate that an insurance policy bought in Texas and
from a Texas insurer would force it or its subsidiary to be sued in the United Kingdom
if it subsequently had a disputed claim for coverage. The intersection of common law
doctrines with European law suggests significant issues for companies from third coun-
tries when negotiating contracts even with wholly domestic companies. The ultimate
result may be the increased likelihood of having to litigate on two continents if a cor-
poration has a European subsidiary and is sued. This at least suggests the possibility of
vexatious litigation whenever a U.S. company is sued in Europe by joining a European
subsidiary or necessary party similar to the way that a plaintiff in U.S. court can avoid
removal to federal court in a nonfederal question case by joining a non-diverse party."3
Cases that an English court might previously have stayed now will have to continue if
the ECJ construes the Brussels Convention/Regulation to foreclose the operation of na-
tional law when the other litigation is pending in the court of a third country.
F. CONCLUSION
Global forum shopping with parallel proceedings has become a global problem requiring
more than unilateral actions to resolve. The possible "communitization" of European law,
along with the efforts of The Hague Conference and the American Law Institute, reflect
attempts to address aspects of multiple proceedings. There is an increasing need for a
consistent jurisprudence in the United States to deal with multiple proceedings, antisuit
injunctions, and deference to other courts. From a procedural standpoint, global efforts to
harmonize approaches to parallel proceedings could lead to a more consistent and predict-
able, as well as less abrasive, method of handling parallel proceedings,14 and help reduce
costs to parties and judicial systems.
53. Perhaps the best known example of this is World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286(1980),
where the anecdotal basis for joining Seaway and World-Wide was to keep the defendants from removing to
federal court and out of the more favorable jury pool in the state court.
54. Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National
Law, 49 Am.J. COMp. LAw 203 (2001).
VOL. 38, NO. 2
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS & DISPUTES 315
II. Developments in Personal Jurisdiction
NANCY S. EISENHAUER*
While 2003 saw no discernable trends in the area of personal jurisdiction, four recent
cases have raised issues that may be of interest to participants in international litigation.
A. ALTERNATIVE MODES OF SERVICE OF PROCESS: U.S. COURT MAY NOT EXERCISE
PERSONAL JURISDICTION WHERE FOREIGN LAW EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS SERVICE
ON DEFENDANT
In Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v. OPEC," the Eleventh Circuit held that a U.S. court may
not exercise personal jurisdiction where foreign law expressly prohibits service on a defen-
dant. In so holding, the court effectively found OPEC and similarly situated international
organizations to be immune from suit in U.S. courts.
The issue arose when the owner of an Alabama gasoline station filed a class action com-
plaint against OPEC alleging that OPEC had coordinated an international conspiracy to
fix world oil prices above competitive levels via agreements among its member states and
non-OPEC members. Prewitt asserted that OPEC's conduct violated U.S. antitrust laws
and resulted in a substantial and adverse impact on U.S. trade and commerce, including a
significant increase in Prewitt's own acquisition and inventory costs for gasoline. As a result,
Prewitt asked the court, in part, to declare the OPEC-coordinated agreements illegal under
U.S. law and enjoin the implementation of the agreements.
OPEC is headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and its relationship with the Austrian gov-
ernment is governed by a 1974 agreement (Headquarters Agreement) that has been incor-
porated into Austrian law by resolution of the Austrian Parliament. 6 Among other things,
the Headquarters Agreement provides that OPEC may be served with legal process only
upon the express consent of OPEC's Secretary General. Accordingly, both the trial court
and the court of appeals found that service on OPEC is prohibited by Austrian law absent
OPEC's express consent. Notably, this type of provision is found in numerous Headquarters
Agreements between sovereign states and international organizations around the world.
In connection with its lawsuit, Prewitt attempted to serve OPEC by registered mail
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2)(C)(ii). OPEC received and reviewed
the pleadings; ultimately, however, the Secretary General determined that OPEC would
not take any action with respect to the complaint and summons. In other words, OPEC
declined to consent to service. Thereafter, without the participation of OPEC, the district
court found that: (1) the agreements between OPEC and non-member states violated U.S.
antitrust laws; (2) the illegal conduct had a substantial and adverse impact on U.S. trade
and commerce of approximately $80-$120 million per day; and (3) OPEC and those acting
in concert with OPEC should be enjoined from entering into, implementing, and enforcing
any further oil price-fixing agreements for a period of twelve months. The court's orders
were delivered to each of the U.S. embassies for OPEC member states.
In response, OPEC made a special appearance and filed motions to set aside the default
judgment and stay enforcement of the injunction. The district court granted the motions.
*Nancy S. Eisenhauer...
55. 353 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003).
56. Id. at 919.
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OPEC then filed a motion to dismiss Prewitt's complaint on various grounds, including
insufficient service of process. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice, find-
ing that Prewitt had failed to serve OPEC properly. Prewitt then filed a motion to pursue
alternative means of effective service. The district court denied the motion finding that, in
this case, OPEC could not be effectively served with process.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on several grounds, holding,
inter alia, that because service on OPEC would substantially conflict with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(f) (1) and (2), service by alternative means under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(f)(3) was impermissible and, if authorized by the district court, would consti-
tute an abuse of discretion. The court supported its ruling by citing to the 1993 Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 4(f)(3), which state, in part, that: "Inasmuch as our Constitution
requires that reasonable notice be given, an earnest effort should be made to devise a method
of communication that is consistent with due process and minimizes offense to foreign law.""
In reaching its decision, the court attempted to distinguish its holding from the Ninth
Circuit's 2002 decision in Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink1s In Rio, the Ninth
Circuit permitted service under Rule 4(f)(3) without regard to the question of whether
service was permissible under the remainder of Rule 4(f). In short, it found that Rule 4(f)
imposed no "hierarchy" of service. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the most important
distinction between the two cases was merely that, in Rio, "there was no discussion of [the
relevant foreign law] at all, much less of any prohibition relating to service of process and
thus, no need to take into account the advisory note to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(f)(3) directing that
alternative service of process should minimize offense to foreign law." 9
B. DiscovERY OF INTERNET AND GENERAL MARKETING PLANs PERMITTED TO ESTABLISH
PERSONAL JURISDICTION ON THE BASIS OF WEB SITE "CONTACTS"
Over the past several years, the federal courts generally have begun to apply the so-called
"Zippo sliding scale test" to determine whether contacts between a defendant's web site and
a plaintiff are sufficient to satisfy due process requirements with respect to personal juris-
diction. 6° Under the Zippo sliding scale, an "interactive" web site is likely to subject the
defendant to personal jurisdiction, whereas a "passive" web site likely will be found insuf-
ficient. However, as cataloged in Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 61 several U.S. courts
recendy have held that, in order to justify the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction on
the basis of an interactive web site, a plaintiff must establish not only the existence of the
web site, but also that the defendant intentionally interacted with the forum state via the
site. In short, the mere operation of a commercially interactive web site:
57. Id. at 927 (emphasis added).
58. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002), cited and discussed inN.JansenCalamita, nternationalLegalDevelopments
in Review: 2002 Business Transactions and Disputes, International Litigation, Recent Developments in Service of Process
Abroad, 37 INrT'L LAw. 479, 482 (2003), and David Lombardero, Developments in Personal Jurisdiction, 37 Icr'L
LAw. at 479-80.
59. Prewitt, 353 F.3d at 928.
60. See, e.g., Amanda Reid, Operationalizing the Law of Jurisdiction: Where In the World Can I Be Sued For
Operating a World Wide Web Page?, 8 COMM. L. & PoL'y 227 (Spring 2003), collecting cases and citing, Zippo
Mftg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), the case from which the "Zippo sliding scale
test" takes its name.
61. 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003).
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should not subject the operator to jurisdiction anywhere in the world. Rather, there must be
evidence that the defendant 'purposefully availed' itself of conducting activity in the forum
state, by directly targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the
forum state via its web site, or through sufficient other related contacts.
62
One troublesome consequence of this new case law for corporate defendants, aside from
being haled into court in foreign jurisdictions, is a potential increase in the discovery of
sensitive business and marketing plans to determine the intentionality of the operation of
the web site. In Toys "R" Us, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's order denying
the plaintiff's request for discovery of the defendant's business and marketing plan on the
basis of both this new case law and allegations that the defendant, a Spanish toy company
known as Step Two, had mimicked Toys "R" Us's internet marketing efforts. According to
the Third Circuit:
[I]t would be reasonable to allow more detailed discovery into Step Two's business plans for
purchases, sales, and marketing. Limited discovery relating to these matters would shed light
on the extent, if any, Step Two's business activity-including, but not limited to, its web site
-were aimed towards the United States. This information, known only to Step Two, would
speak to an essential element of the personal jurisdiction calculus.63
C. OPERATION OF ICANN's UDRP RULES SUBJECT CITY COUNCIL OF BARCELONA, SPAIN,
TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN U.S. COURT FOR PURPOSES OF CLAIM UNDER FEDERAL
ANTICYBERSQUATTING ACT
ICANN is a private, non-profit organization that acts as the coordinating body for the
internet's domain name and numbering systems. ICANN accredits domain name registrars
around the world and has, among other things, promulgated the UDRP for the resolution
of disputes related to domain names. ICANN's UDRP Rules provide an administrative
proceeding in which a trademark owner may seek to cancel or transfer a domain name that
infringes on its trademark.- Among other things, the Rules require that complainants in-
clude in any UDRP complaint a statement that they will submit, with respect to any chal-
lenges to a decision in the administrative proceeding canceling or transferring a domain
name, to the jurisdiction of the courts located either at: (1) the principal office of the relevant
domain name registrar; or (2) the domain name holders' address at the time the complaint
is submitted.65
In Barcelona.Com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona,66 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit asserted personal jurisdiction over the City Council of Bar-
celona, Spain, for purposes of a claim of "reverse domain name hijacking" under the ACPA67
by virtue of a demand for arbitration filed by the City Council pursuant to the UDRP
Rules. In general, the ACPA gives trademark owners the ability to redress cybersquatting
62. Id. at 454.
63. Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
64. ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available at http'./www.
icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htn (last visited May 26, 2004).
65. Id. 3(b)(xiii) (requiring consent to jurisdiction in "at least one specified Mutual Jurisdiction"). Id. T 1
(defining term "Mutual Jurisdiction").
66. 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
67. 15 U.S.C. §1114(3)(D)(v) (2003).
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or domain name "hijacking." Reverse domain name hijacking occurs when a trademark
owner overreaches in exercising its rights under the ACPA. Specifically, section 114(2)(D)
(v) of the ACPA gives domain name registrants the right to commence an action against a
trademark owner to declare that the domain name registration or use by the registrant is
not unlawful under the Lanham Act.
The domain name at issue in both the U.S. courts and the UDRP administrative pro-
ceeding was "barcelona.com." A Spanish citizen, Joan Nogueras Cobo (Nogueras), regis-
tered the domain name in his wife's name (she was also a Spanish citizen) in 1996 through
the registrar Network Solutions, Inc., in Herndon, Virginia. In May 2000, the City Council
of Barcelona sent a letter to Nogueras demanding that he transfer the domain name to the
City Council. The Council owned about 150 trademarks issued in Spain, the majority of
which included the word "Barcelona." The City Council took the position that the domain
name "barcelona.com" was confusingly similar to a number of trademarks that the City
Council owned.
A few days after he received the letter, Nogueras transferred ownership of the domain
name from his wife to Barcelona.Com, Inc. (BCom), a Delaware company which he had
formed in 1999. Although BCom had a New York mailing address, it had no employees in
the United States, did not own or lease office space in the United States, and did not have
a telephone line in the United States. Its computer server was located in Spain. After BCom
refused to transfer the domain name to the City Council, the City Council invoked the
UDRP to resolve the dispute, filing an administrative complaint with the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), an ICANN-authorized dispute resolution provider located
in Switzerland. The complaint sought transfer of the domain name "barcelona.com" to the
City Council on the ground that BCom had no rights to the domain name under Spanish
law. The WIPO Panel agreed, and ordered BCom to transfer the domain name to the City
Council. In response to the WIPO Panel's decision, BCom filed a complaint against the
City Council in the federal court in Virginia under the ACPA seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that BCom's use of the domain name was not unlawful under the Lanham Act.
In its WIPO complaint, the City Council had included, as required by the UDRP Rules,
a statement concerning jurisdiction over claims in court contesting the WIPO decision.
Specifically, in its complaint, the City Council had consented to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Virginia, the location of the domain registrar, Network Solutions, Inc., "with
respect to any challenge that may be made by the Respondent to a decision by the [WIPO]
Administrative Panel to transfer or cancel the domain names that are [the] subject of this
complaint."6 Because the City Council had based its complaint before the WIPO Panel
on Spanish law, it argued in the U.S. courts that personal and subject matter jurisdiction
must "rest[] on a recognition of the WIPO proceeding and the law that the WIPO panelist
applied. 69
The district court agreed with the City Council. It reviewed the WIPO Panel's findings
and found, consistent with the Panel's decision, that BCom had did not have a right to use
the domain name under Spanish law. As a result, it declined to issue a declaratory judgment
in BCom's favor under the ACPA.
BCom appealed and the Fourth Circuit reversed, ultimately declaring that BCom had
the right to use the domain name under U.S. law. With respect to the question of jurisdic-
68. Barcelona. Corn, 330 F.3d at 621.
69. Id. at 623.
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tion, the Fourth Circuit held that the WIPO proceeding "is not jurisdictional; indeed, the
WIPO panelist's decision is not even entitled to deference on the merits." 0 Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit asserted personal jurisdiction over the City Council on the ground that
it had consented to jurisdiction in the federal court in Virginia with respect to any challenge
to the WIPO Panel's decision in the administrative proceeding, such as BCom's ACPA
action.
Regardless of whether the Fourth Circuit's decision is correct as a legal matter under
U.S. law, it appears clear that at the time that the City Council consented to jurisdiction
in its UDRP complaint, it did not understand that its consent would extend to subject
matter jurisdiction under the U.S. federal anticybersquatting law. Even so, in the long run,
the City Council likely could not have prevented the U.S. courts from declaring BCom's
use of the domain name "barcelona.com" lawful under the Lanham Act; the ACPA permits
a domain name user to file a suit for declaratory judgment against not only the trademark
owner, but also against the domain name registrar, in this case, Network Solutions, Inc., a
U.S. company.
Barcelona.com, however, does demonstrate at least two factors that counsel for a foreign
corporation should consider before filing a UDRP complaint. First, counsel simply should
be aware that U.S. courts will not interpret a statement consenting to jurisdiction in a
UDRP complaint as somehow being limited to the specific issues adjudicated in the UDRP
administrative proceeding. In short, by consenting to personal jurisdiction in the U.S. courts
on issues related to cybersquatting, a foreign corporation is implicitly agreeing to the ap-
plication of U.S. trademark and cybersquatting law in U.S. courts. Second, bearing the first
point in mind, foreign corporations should consider whether initiating a UDRP proceeding
in the first instance is in their best interest. In both Barcelona. Corn and the recent decision
in Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc., 71 the Fourth Circuit recognized that the UDRP does
not in every case preclude direct redress to courts of competent jurisdiction. Consequently,
a foreign corporation under certain circumstances may be able to seek redress in the courts
of its own nation, and thereby forego the need to consent to jurisdiction under the UDRP
Rules.
D. ASSIGNEE OF CONTRACT RIGHTS DOES NOT AuToMATIcALLY "STEP INTO THE SHOES"
OF ASSIGNOR FOR PURPOSES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In Purdue Research Foundation v. Sanofi-Syntbelabo, SA., 72 the Seventh Circuit became the
first appellate court to address the question of whether an assignee of a contract, as opposed
to a successor-in-interest, necessarily assumes the assignor's contacts with the forum state
for purposes of personal jurisdiction. The parties to the case were Purdue Research Foun-
dation (PRF), the contracting authority for all sponsored research undertaken at Purdue
University, and Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A. (SSBO France), a French corporation in the busi-
ness of developing, manufacturing, and selling pharmaceuticals.
PRF sued SSBO France for breach of contract, alleging that it was entitled to certain
payments from SSBO France under a cooperative research agreement that SSBO France
had acquired from Sterling Winthrop, Inc. (Sterling) through an asset purchase agreement.
70. Id.
71. 337 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003).
72. 338 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2003).
SUMMER 2004
320 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The original contract between PRF and Sterling related to the development of an antiviral
drug known as pleconaril. In seeking dismissal of the case for want of personal jurisdiction,
SSBO France did not dispute that the court properly could have exercised personal juris-
diction over Sterling if it had been a defendant in the case, nor did SSBO France disagree
with the proposition that the jurisdictional contacts of a predecessor corporation may be
imputed to its successor corporation without offending due process. Instead, SSBO France
argued that, at least in the present case, it was more appropriately characterized as the
assignee of certain intellectual property rights sold by Sterling, and it would be unfair to
impute to it the contacts that Sterling had with the forum state in a significantly different
stage in the contractual relationship.
The Seventh Circuit agreed, noting that "[g]iven the Supreme Court's emphasis on the
need for an individual assessment of a particular defendant's contacts with the forum state,
the distinction between a corporate successor and an assignee of a contract is a sound one." 3
According to the court, because the corporate successor "has chosen to accept the business
expectations of those who have dealt previously with that predecessor.., it can be expected
to be haled into the same courts as its predecessor."74 In contrast:
An assignee does not have the same relationship with the entities that contracted with the
assignor. Rather, it purchases certain specific contractual rights and assumes certain spe-
cific obligations. Because due process generally requires that each defendant's contacts
with the forum state be assessed individually, a general rule that imputes the assignor's
forum contacts to the assignee would, at least in some cases, violate the established norms
of due process."5
After examining the contacts of SSBO France with the forum state, the Seventh Circuit
ultimately determined that SSBO France did not have contacts with the forum state suffi-
cient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
I. Recent Developments in the Service of Process Abroad
JEFFREY A. Fuisz and CARLY HENEK*
A. INTRODUCTION
In federal courts, the service of process outside the United States in civil actions is gov-
erned by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 In state courts, the particular
procedures of the forum state apply. In either case, however, where service is to be made
in a foreign state that is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
73. Id. at 784.
74. Id.
75. Id.
*Jeffrey A. Fuisz is a partner and Carly Henek is an associate at Kaye Scholer LLP in New York.
76. There are two rules of Federal Civil Procedure that apply to service of process upon an international
entity located outside of the United States: Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(0 governs service upon individuals in a foreign
country, while Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h) governs service of process upon corporations and associations. In addition,
service of process on foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities must generally be effected in
accordance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2003).
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Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (Hague Convention), the Supreme Court has directed
that the Hague Convention provides the exclusive means for effecting service on the ter-
ritory of a signatory state." Where service on a foreign party may be effected in the United
States without the need for service abroad, the Supreme Court has held that the Hague
Convention is not applicable.
B. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
1. Service by Mail under Hague Convention Article 1 0(a)
One issue that continues to cause disagreement among federal and state courts is whether
article 10(a) of the Hague Convention, preserving "the freedom to send judicial documents,
by postal channels, directly to persons abroad," s authorizes the service of judicial documents
by mail, or whether it merely authorizes the mailing of documents other than process."
9
As 2003 began, a bankruptcy court in Delaware, citing the absence of controlling pre-
cedent in the Third Circuit, sided with the proponents of a liberal construction of article
10(a), and permitted service of process by mail on defendants located in the United King-
dom.80 Persuaded by the Second Circuit's decision in Ackerman v. Levine,
s
" the court found
that for the purposes of article 10(a), "send" means "service of process" and "the drafters
only varied the language used." 2
In contrast, in Basbam v. Tillaart,83 a Tennessee appellate court followed the Eighth Cir-
cuit's leading decision in Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp.,- and held that article 10(a) does
not permit service of process by mail. In finding service upon defendants in Canada by
registered mail deficient, the court distinguished between the process of papers that initiate
an action and the service of papers that follow, holding that article 10(a) permits the sending
77. VolkswagenwerkAG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
78. Emphasis added. Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention provides in pertinent part: "Provided the State
of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with (a) the freedom to send judicial
documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad .. " Hague Conference PIL Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, art.
10.
79. In either case, article 10(a) may only be used if the receiving state has not registered its opposition
pursuant to article 21.
80. In re Harnischfeger Indus., Inc., No. 99-02171 PJW, 2003 WL 23390, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 2,
2003).
81. 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
82. In re Harnischfeger Indus., 2003 WL 23390, at *4. See also NSM Music, Inc. v. Alvarez, No. 02 C 6482,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2964 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2003) (stating that "so long as the applicable treaty permits it
and so long as the country of destination does not prohibit it, process may be served on an individual in a
foreign country via mailing," but finding service was improper because plaintiffhad used Federal Express rather
than certified mail, and failed to provide the "signed receipt" required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4({(2)(C)(ii)); Snead
v. Snead, 2020052, 2003 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 412 (Ala. Civ. App. June 20, 2003) (upholding trial court's
order authorizing service of process by certified mail and first class mail where the non-resident defendant was
avoiding personal service); Delinger v. Chinadotcom Corp., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1404 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(concluding that the view that article 10(a) permits service of process by mail "represents the better position");
Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods., N.V., No. 18524-NC, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS
72, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2003) (same).
83. No. M2002-00723-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2003).
84. No. M2002-00723-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2003).
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of judicial documents after the initial service of process, but does not allow service of process
to notify defendant of a pending action by mail.8s
These recent contrasting views cannot be reconciled, and therefore, absent controlling
guidance from the Courts of Appeals or the Supreme Court, this uncertainty requires
practitioners to exercise caution and avoid reliance on service by mail under the Hague
Convention. 6
2. Service by Federal Express under the Hague Convention
While courts remain divided on the issue of whether the Hague Convention permits
service of process by mail, in 2003 two judges in the Eastern District of Illinois tackled the
specific issue of the effectiveness of service via Federal Express. 7
In NSM Music, Inc. v. Alvarez, 8 plaintiffs attempted to serve process on a defendant
individual and defendant corporations in Mexico via Federal Express. 89 In support of their
motion for a default judgment, plaintiffs submitted a brief containing evidence from Federal
Express's on-line tracking service reflecting that both sets of packages were successfully
delivered, an affidavit of service, an affidavit from counsel, and other supporting materials °
In holding service inadequate, the court found two flaws: first, Federal Express is "neither
a 'postal channel' (the term used in the Hague Convention) nor 'mail' (the term used in
the Federal Rules)" and second, "plaintiffs have failed to provide the Court with any evi-
dence of a 'signed receipt,' which the Federal Rules specifically require."9' The court ad-
mitted that "[t]hese points might seem technical," but explained that where plaintiffs ask a
court "to extend its reach abroad ... careful adherence to the requirements of international
treaties and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is called for."92
Similarly, in Baker v. Kngsley,93 another judge of the same court also found service via
Federal Express ineffective. There, plaintiffs had attempted to serve an individual defendant
and resident of Italy, Katz, by Federal Express. Plaintiffs thereafter filed a "return of service"
that included a summons, a copy of a Federal Express International Waybill purporting to
85. Basham, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 at *12-13. See also Uppendahl v. American Honda Motor Co.,
Civil Action No. 3:03CV-24-S, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20717 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 17, 2003).
86. For a more extensive, recent survey of the issues raised under article 10(a), see generally Alexandra
Amiel, Note, Recent Developments in the Interpretation ofArticle 10(a) of the Hague Convention on the ServiceAbroad
ofjudicial and Ertrajudicial Documents, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. Rxv. 387 (2001).
87. It is worth noting that where a defendant has challenged the sufficiency of service of process with a
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), the burden is on the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing
that service was proper. See, e.g., losello v. Lexington Law Firm, No. 03 C 987, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14591,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2003) ("Once a defendant has challenged the sufficiency of service of process with a
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), the burden is upon the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing
that there was proper service."); Mende v. Milestone Tech., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(same).
88. NSM Music, Inc., No. 02 C 6482, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2964.
89. Plaintiffs initially attempted to serve defendants by a private server before resorting to the use of Federal
Express. Id. at *3. The court rejected this attempt at service as inadequate because the Hague Convention, to
which Mexico is a signatory, does not contemplate personal service by a privately retained process server. Id.
90. Id. at *2.
91. Id. at *5.
92. Id. But cf. Koechli v. BIP Int'l, No. 1D03-1009, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 18678, at *5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Dec. 8, 2003) (upholding service despite technical defects, stating "[wlhere a plaintiff has attempted in good
faith to comply with the Hague Convention, and where a defendant receives sufficient notice despite a technical
defect, it is within a court's discretion to declare service properly perfected").
93. 294 F.Supp.2d 970 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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show a transmittal of unspecified contents from plaintiffs' counsel to Katz, and a printout
from the Federal Express website that the package was signed for by ".MORO." Plaintiffs
did not file a certificate of service, a marshal's return, or any other document indicating
that Katz had received service. The court found service insufficient "in light of plaintiffs'
failure to produce an affidavit of service or any other evidence to show that Katz personally
received the summons and complaint from plaintiffs,"- and quashed the service.
Without further guidance on the matter, practitioners are best advised to avoid attempt-
ing service abroad via Federal Express, or if it cannot be avoided, at least be prepared to
submit evidence that the service was received by the person for whom it was intended.
C. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER RULE 4 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ten years after Congress completely overhauled Rule 4 with the 1993 amendments, the
provisions of the rule continue to raise some difficult issues.95
1. Service of Process on Corporations Abroad Pursuant to the Laws of the Foreign Country
In both Convention and non-Convention cases over the past year, courts struggled with
the interpretive difficulties that can arise under Rule 4 when service of process is made on
a corporation abroad pursuant to the rules prescribed by the laws of the foreign country.
Under Rule 4(h)(2), service of process on a corporation outside of the United States may
be made "in any manner prescribed for individuals" pursuant to Rule 4(f), except by means
of "personal delivery" under Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i). 96 Rule 4(f)(2)(A), however, provides that
service of process abroad may be made "in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign
country for service in that country."97
In 2003, courts continued to wrestle with the issue of whether the proscription against
personal service on a foreign corporation in Rule 4(h)(2) will prohibit the availability of
such service under article 10 if personal service is otherwise permitted by the laws of the
receiving state. Two cases decided this year, both involving the question of effectiveness of
personal service on a Mexican corporation by a privately retained process server, took very
different approaches. In NSM Music, Inc. v. Alvarez,9s though the propriety of personal
service and service by mail upon a foreign individual was at issue, the court began its analysis
with the blanket proposition that personal service on a foreign corporation is prohibited
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). In contrast, in Casa de Cambio Delgado, Inc. v. Cases
De Cambio Puebla, S.A., 99 where the plaintiff served the defendant foreign corporation per-
sonally by a Mexican attorney, the court skipped the issue of personal service upon a foreign
94. Id at 980.
95. Plaintiffs can avoid this thorny area entirely if they can obtain a waiver of service from defendant pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). Rule 4(d) provides that a plaintiff may notify a defendant, by first class mail or "other
reliable means" of the commencement of an action and request that defendant waive service of a summons.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 4(d). This method involves minimal cost or effort on plaintiff's part, and little downside risk.
If the defendant agrees to waive service the pitfalls associated with service under the Hague Convention fall
away. If, however, the defendant refuses to waive service, plaintiff may still simply serve by the means provided
by the Hague Convention. Practitioners should note, however, that defendants served in this manner outside
the United States are permitted 90 days to serve an answer to the complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2).
97. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(0(2)(A).
98. NSMMusic, Inc., No. 02 C 6482, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2964.
99. 763 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
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corporation altogether. Instead, the court began its analysis with whether plaintiff was per-
mitted to use a privately-retained attorney for service, or was required to utilize Mexico's
Central Authority of judicial and extrajudicial documents from other Contracting States
for service.
Due to the divergence of judicial approaches, and absent controlling guidance from the
Supreme Court, practitioners are recommended to exercise an abundance of caution when
addressing matters in this area.
2. The Effect, if Any, of Rule 4(m) on Service on Foreign Corporations
In the past year, one court has addressed the issue of whether Rule 4(m)'s exclusion from
the requirement that service be effected within 120 days of filing the complaint applies to
service upon foreign corporations. 100 In In re Imperial Home Decor Group, Inc.,1°1 in denying
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court sided with other courts that have held that the
exclusion applies to foreign corporations. The court permitted service to be effected more
than 120 days after the filing of the complaint. In addition, two district courts declined to
reach the issue this year.102 Practitioners are advised to effectuate service promptly, so as to
avoid the uncertainty of whether Rule 4(m)'s exclusion applies.
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. STATE LAW AND THE
HAGUE CONVENTION
Courts continue to struggle with the meaning of the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, that "[i]f the internal law of the forum state defines the
applicable method of serving process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad,
then the Hague Service Convention applies." 10
Blades v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. is an apt example.-s There, plaintiffs attempted to
serve a parent corporation located in Canada by service on a subsidiary located in Mississippi
under Louisiana's long-arm statute. Defendant argued that service was ineffective for two
reasons: (1) service on a subsidiary is not effective service on the parent; and (2) service via
the Louisiana long-arm statute does not comply with the Hague Convention.05 s In support
of their position, plaintiffs asserted that "Schlunk makes service pursuant to the Hague
Convention optional where the forum state's long-arm statute alternatively satisfies the
Convention's goals."106 Rejecting plaintiffs' arguments, the court held:
Schlunk merely recognizes that when the law of the forum state deems the local subsidiary as
the parent's agent, then service on the parent can be made locally thereby eliminating the need
100. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) provides in relevant part: "If service of the summons and complaint is not made
upon a defendant with 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court.., shall dismiss the action....
This subdivision does not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to subdivision () or 0)(i)."
101. 294 B.R. 607 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
102. In re Train Derailment Near Amite, La. MDL No. 1531 Section "A", 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18589
(E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2003) (holding that even though plaintiffs had failed to serve defendants in the six months
after the court's original determination that service was improper, plaintiffs would still be allowed an additional
fifteen days to serve, after which defendant would be permitted to bring a renewed motion to dismiss); In re
Harnischfeger Indus., 288 B.R. 79 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (declining to reach issue).
103. VolkswagenwerkAG, 486 U.S. at 700.
104. No. 02-3121, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3823 (E.D. La. Mar. 12, 2003).
105. Id. at "5.
106. Id.
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to transmit documents abroad. In such a case, where no documents need to be transmitted
abroad, then the Convention, pursuant to its express terms, does not apply.
107
Similarly, in Froland v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd.,' 08 the court was presented with the issue
of whether service on a Japanese corporation was effected properly where plaintiff served
the summons and complaint in English on the Minnesota Secretary of State who in turn
sent the documents by mail to the defendant corporation in Japan. In finding that service
was not proper, the court first turned to Minnesota law to determine whether the Hague
Convention applied. Yamaha argued that the Hague Convention applied because, while
Minnesota law permitted service on a foreign corporation by service on the Minnesota
Secretary of State, such service would not be complete until the Secretary transmitted the
documents to the foreign corporation. Plaintiff contended that the Hague Convention did
not apply because process was complete upon service on the Secretary of State. The court
sided with Yamaha, holding that the Hague Convention applied as service was not effected
fully until the Secretary of State transmitted the documents to defendants. Requiring less,
the court noted, would disregard the due process requirement of notice that was the very
purpose of service. The court then turned to whether service was proper under the Con-
vention. On this issue, the court found that the service failed to comply with the require-
ments of the Convention because Japan requires that service of process be made via
its Central Authority, not mail, and in the Japanese language, which plaintiffs had not
provided.-
Each of these cases required resolution of detailed issues of state law once again
suggesting:
iThere has been more than a measure of truth to Justice Brennan's concern in Schlunk that a
rule which leaves the determination of the Hague Convention's application to 'the internal
law of the forum state' runs the risk in the United States of creating fifty different standards
for fifty different states." 0
E. ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
1. Hague Convention
Romania acceded to the Hague Convention on August 21, 2003. Ratification remains
outstanding.
2. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory
There were no new accessions to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory
or its Additional Protocol in 2003.
107. Id.
108. No. 02-4226 (DSD/JGL), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22890 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2003).
109. See also Hickory Travel Sys., Inc. v. TUI AG, 213 F.R.D. 547 (N.D. Ca. 2003) (applying California
law in determining whether service on a subsidiary is sufficient service on the German parent).
110. N. Jansen Calamita, International Legal Developments in Review: 2002, Business Transactions & Dis-
putes, International Litigation, Recent Developments in the Service of Process Abroad, 37 Ir'L LAW. 483, 487
(2003).
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IV. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
HEATHER FAN*
A. INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New
York Convention or the Convention) governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards in U.S. courts."' The principles of comity as set forth in Hilton v. Guyot
govern recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments in U.S. courts."2 Although
no federal statute or treaty governs the enforcement of foreign court money judgments in
the United States, many states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Rec-
ognition Act (Uniform Act), which largely codifies the principles set forth in Hilton.
B. THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AwARDs
1. Non-recognition based on Invalid Agreements to Arbitrate
The New York Convention sets forth enumerated grounds for the non-recognition of
foreign arbitral awards."' In Cbina Minmetals Materials Import and Export Co. v. Chi Mei
Corp., the Third Circuit considered a case where the agreement containing the arbitration
clause on which the arbitral panel rested its jurisdiction was allegedly void ab initio."4 Pur-
suant to an arbitration clause in a disputed sale of goods contract, a foreign arbitral panel
awarded the plaintiff, Minmetals, an excess of $4 million. Minmetals then sought to enforce
the arbitration award in New Jersey, and the district court entered an order granting the
plaintiff's motion to confirm and enforce the award.
On appeal, the primary issue was whether the district court properly enforced the foreign
arbitral award where the foreign arbitration panel had rejected the defendants' argument
that the documents providing for arbitration were forged. In its analysis, the Third Circuit
considered cases under article II of the New York Convention setting forth grounds for
compelling arbitration based upon the existence of "an agreement [to arbitrate] in writing,"
and cases under article V of the Convention providing that once an award is made, the
courts must enforce that award unless one of the specified grounds for non-enforcement is
proven."' On this basis, the court determined:
[A] party that opposes enforcement of a foreign arbitration award under the Convention on
the grounds that the alleged agreement containing the arbitration clause on which the arbitral
panel rested its jurisdiction was void ab initio is entitled to present evidence of such invalidity
to the district court, which must make an independent determination of the agreement's va-
*Heather Fan is an attorney with the firm of Howrey Simon Arnold & White LLP.
111. New York Convention. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, TIAS 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention], im-
plemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2004).
112. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
113. New York Convention, supra note 111, art. V
114. China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 289 (3d Cir. 2003).
115. Id. at 284. In his concurrence, Circuit Judge Alito also looked to article IV's requirement that a party
seeking to enforce an award submit "at the time of the application.... the original agreement" Id. at 292-94
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lidity and therefore of the arbitrability of the dispute, at least in the absence of a waiver
precluding the defense." 6
Given the disputed facts in the case, the court remanded the case to the district court to
ascertain the validity of the contracts. The Third Circuit specifically found that since the
defendant, Chi Mei, consistently objected to the arbitral panel's jurisdiction and may not
have been able to enjoin the arbitration, Chi Mei had not waived its objection to the panel's
jurisdiction by participating in the arbitration.
2. Non-enforcement based on Public Policy and Affirmative Defenses Not in the New York
Convention
In Consorcio Rive, S.A. de C.V v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc.," 7 the Fifth Circuit addressed the
issue of the non-enforcement of an arbitral award based on grounds of public policy and
affirmative defenses not set forth in the New York Convention. In that case, the plaintiff,
a Mexican corporation, entered into an agreement with a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
defendant whereby the plaintiff was to provide property and permits to the subsidiary to
open a restaurant and bar in Mexico. The plaintiff commenced arbitration against the
subsidiary after a dispute arose involving payments due under the agreement. After an-
swering the plaintiff's demand for arbitration, the subsidiary refused to participate in the
proceedings. The arbitral panel issued an award, and the plaintiff sought to enforce the
award against the subsidiary and the parent pursuant to the Convention. The district court
dismissed the suit against the parent company and held the award enforceable against the
subsidiary.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's enforcement of the award against the
subsidiary. In doing so, the court examined a number of the defendants' arguments under
the Convention. First, the court held that the district court properly refused to allow the
defendants to raise affirmative defenses that were "not cognizable" under the Convention.
Second, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the obligation to arbitrate ter-
minated when the underlying contract terminated. Third, the Fifth Circuit held that certain
concurrent civil and criminal proceedings initiated in Mexico by the plaintiff, which the
defendants contended were a "tool of 'intimidation and extortion,"' were not contrary to
the public policy exception under article V(2)(b).of the New York Convention." 8 Lastly,
the court found that the fear of arrest occasioned by the concurrent criminal proceedings
did not render the individual owners of the defendant corporations "otherwise unable to
present [their] case" under the exception to enforcement contained in article V(l)(b) of the
New York Convention. 19
C. THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
1. Non-recognition based on Public Policy and Due Process
The Uniform Act sets forth provisions for the non-recognition of foreign money judg-
ments.'2" In Society of Lloyd's v. Mullin,12 1 a district court examined a number of those
116. See id. at 289-90 (explaining that "international law overwhelmingly favors some form ofjudicial review
of an arbitral tribunal's decision that it has jurisdiction over a dispute, at least where the challenging party
claims that the contract on which the tribunal rested its jurisdiction was invalid").
117. 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24064 (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 2003).
118. Id. at *9-10.
119. Id. at*ll-12.
120. The Uniform Act codifies many of the principles set forth in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
Under those principles, a foreign judgment should be recognized in a U.S. court if the foreign forum:
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grounds for recognition of judgments when it enforced an English judgment against a
U.S. resident under Pennsylvania's Uniform Act. An English court entered a judgment
against a Name at Lloyd's of London for breach of contract when the defendant Name
refused to pay a reinsurance premium. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a complaint in
federal district court in Pennsylvania seeking enforcement of the judgment under the
Uniform Act."'
In rejecting the defendant's arguments for non-recognition, the court examined discre-
tionary and non-discretionary exceptions to recognition contained in the Uniform Act. The
court determined that the English judicial system conformed to the requirements of due
process of law, noting that in making its determination it considered the English judiciary
as a whole, rather than the "particulars" of the English court's decision in the case before
it. Further, the court refused to consider the defendant's allegation of impropriety in the
formation of the underlying agreement. The court held that the issue could have been
litigated before the English court and did not constitute fraud on the proceedings. Lastly,
the court found no support for the contention that a cause of action for breach of contract
was repugnant to Pennsylvania public policy. Noting the "high threshold" of proof required
to meet the public policy exception, the court observed that "[t]he fact that Pennsylvania
courts might reach a different conclusion if the same breach of contract action were pursued
in Pennsylvania does not mean the 'cause of action' asserted in the English Judgment is
repugnant to Pennsylvania public policy.""' The court noted the significance of the defen-
dant having agreed that any disputes would be subject to English law when he signed the
agreement in the first place. Based on this analysis, the court granted the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment and enforced the English award.
2. Non-recognition of Non-specific Monetary Judgments
The non-recognition of non-specific monetary judgments was at issue in Nicor Interna-
tional Corp. v. El Paso Corp. 124 There, the plaintiff, a consulting company in Panama, entered
into an agreement with the defendant energy holding company to provide consulting ser-
vices for possible energy-related projects in the Dominican Republic. When the defendant
energy holding company allegedly breached the agreement, an assignee of the consulting
company's rights filed suit in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican court determined
that the subject matter was covered by an arbitration agreement and referred the parties to
arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce. An arbitrator heard the case
and entered an award in favor of the defendants. Following the arbitration proceeding, the
Dominican Court of Appeals, however, issued a "sentence" finding the defendant energy
holding company liable for breach. The plaintiff consulting company then sought to enforce
the Dominican Court's "sentence" under Florida's version of the Uniform Act.
(1) allowed a court of competent jurisdiction to give a full and fair trial on the issues presented; (2) ensured
that justice was impartially administered; (3) ensured that the trial was free of fraud or prejudice; (4) had properjurisdiction over the parties; and (5) the judgment of the foreign forum did not violate public policy.
121. 255 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
122. See id. at 471- 72. The plaintiff also moved for summary judgment seedng enforcement of the judgment
under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, but this was not contested in the case. Id.
123. Id. at 476.
124. 292 F. Supp 2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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In refusing to enforce the Dominican judgment, the court examined two provisions under
the Uniform Act. The court first looked to the Uniform Act's application to "any foreign
judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered." 21 It found that the
Dominican judgment did not grant a definite monetary sum, and as such was not a final
award of a sum of money entitled to recognition. Moreover, the court also examined
whether non-recognition of the Dominican judgment was permissible under the Uniform
Act's exception for proceedings in foreign courts that are "contrary to an agreement be-
tween the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court." 26 The court determined that the proceedings in the Dominican
courts were contrary to the binding arbitration provisions in the parties' agreement and
participation in the Dominican litigation did not waive arbitration. On these grounds, the
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and declined to recognize the
Dominican judgment.'27
V. Discovery in International Litigation
CATHERINE PICHO*
A. INTRODUCTION
Section 1782 of title 28 of the U.S. Code allows foreign courts or private litigants in a
foreign proceeding-including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusa-
tion-to apply directly to a U.S. federal district court for an order directing a person or
entity in the United States to give testimony or to produce documents or other physical
evidence. 2' Accordingly, section 1782 does not require that requests for evidence be chan-
neled through governmental bureaucracies as would be required under the Hague Con-
vention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. 2 9
The decisions reported in U.S. courts in 2003 on the determination of requests under
28 U.S.C. § 1782 demonstrate a growing concern for principles of sovereignty and inter-
national comity. Further, they indicate that courts will continue to afford assistance to
foreign tribunals and governments in discovery-related proceedings in order to facilitate
legitimate discovery requests. Accordingly, section 1782 remains an effective and popular
means of obtaining evidence in the United States for foreign or international proceedings
and is likely to be used more frequently in the future, especially in light of the war on
terrorism. As for the decisions reported on discovery pursuant to the Hague Evidence
Convention for use in U.S. proceedings, they tend to favor full and complete discovery.
125. Id. at 1365.
126. Id. at 1367.
127. The court also confirmed the arbitration award under the Convention. Id. at 1371-75.
*Catherine Pich6 is an attorney in commercial litigation at Ogilvy Renault in Montreal, Quebec.
128. Pursuant to subsection 1782(a), a U.S. district court is authorized to order a person who resides or is
"found" in the district where the court sits to comply with letters rogatory or requests made by a foreign or
international tribunal, or by the application of any "interested person," "for use in a proceeding in a foreign
or international tribunal."
129. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23
U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444. The Hague Evidence Convention provides procedures for judicial authorities
of one signatory country to use in requesting evidence located in another signatory country.
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B. OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
1. Certiorari Granted in Ninth Circuit Decision that Permitted Discovery under Section 1782
for Use in European Commission Antitrust Investigation
On November 10, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,130 a case regarding the availability of a discovery order from a
U.S. district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, in connection with a complainant in an
antitrust matter before the European Commission. In the case, it is anticipated that the
Court will address important and unsettled matters respecting the rights of an applicant to
obtain discovery under section 1782 for use "in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal.""'
More particularly, in the case the Supreme Court will review a Ninth Circuit decision
which held that a preliminary investigation of an antitrust complaint by the European
Commission qualifies as a "proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" for the pur-
pose of ordering domestic discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782.132 At issue is whether section
1782 authorizes the grant of discovery to a non-litigant in connection with a foreign in-
vestigation, or instead grants discovery only to litigants involved in actual judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings. Further, the case also raises one of the most widely litigated issues
regarding section 1782: whether section 1782 imposes a foreign discoverability require-
ment. A decision is expected in 2004.
2. Section 1782 Applications and Principles of Sovereignty and International Comity
In In re application of Michael Schmitz,113 the Southern District of New York denied a
section 1782 application based on the fact that allowing discovery might offend the foreign
country's sovereignty and discourage future assistance to U.S. courts in other cases. The
Plaintiffs sought documents in certain lawsuits pending in Germany against Deutsche Te-
lekom. The 300,000 documents sought had been previously produced by Deutsche Telekom
in a securities class action in the United States and lay in the possession of Deutsche Te-
lekom's lawyers and the two firms that represented the class plaintiffs. Deutsche Telekom's
lawyers opposed the 28 U.S.C. § 1782 request, arguing that it did not satisfy the statutory
requirement that documents be "found" in the district in which the application is made, as
the documents were only temporarily in the custody of the lawyers for the purpose of the
U.S. litigation.
The court rejected that argument, equating the presence of the documents, even tem-
porarily, with tag jurisdiction over an individual.11 Nevertheless, the court pointed out that
although the statutory requirements had been met, district courts retain a broad discretion
in deciding 28 U.S.C. § 1782 requests. The court explained that this discretion must be
exercised in light of the twin aims of the statute: (1) providing efficient means of assistance
to participants in international litigation; and (2) encouraging foreign countries by example
to provide similar means of assistance to U.S. courts.
130. 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted 124 S. Ct. 531 (2003) (No. 02-572).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 259 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
134. Id. at 296, 297. The Court reasoned: "It is sufficient that respondents reside in this district, as they
concededly do." Id.
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In Schmitz, the court emphasized that the German applicants for the section 1782 order
had already attempted to obtain the same documents from the Public Prosecution Office
in Bonn but had been refused access. Moreover, the court noted that granting the section
1782 request might result in a possible affront to German sovereignty, as well as possibly
jeopardizing the ongoing German criminal investigation. Taken together, the court con-
cluded that the petitioners' application would not promote section 1782's aims and denied
the application. Indeed, the court held that allowing discovery that German authorities
could have provided, but refused, might encourage foreign tribunals to disregard sover-
eignty concerns of the United States and discourage future assistance to U.S. courts.
The exercise of judicial discretion also played a role in another decision in the Southern
District of New York relating to a section 1782 application. In In re Letter Rogatoryfrom the
Nedenes District Court, Norway, " a motion was granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to
compel an individual to provide a blood sample in connection with a paternity proceeding
in Norway. Once again the court relied upon principles of sovereignty and international
comity in reaching its decision.
The court in Nedenes began by establishing that the requirements of section 1782 were
met because: (1) the person from whom discovery was sought resided in New York; (2) the
discovery, a blood sample, was for use in a proceeding before a Norwegian court; and
(3) the application was made by the Norwegian court through the U.S. Attorney's Office.
As in Schmitz, however, the court pointed out that meeting the requirements of the statute
did not "end the inquiry," as district courts are given broad discretion over the issuance of
discovery orders under section 1782, which must be exercised in light of the aims of the
statute. 36 Here, those aims were satisfied because the request was made directly by the
Norwegian court and would encourage Norway to provide similar assistance to U.S. courts
in the future. Further, following the guidance of the Second Circuit regarding the issue of
discoverability under the foreign court's own laws, the court declined to undertake an
inquiry into whether Norwegian law would permit the discovery of blood samples. 37 Thus,
the Court ordered the individual to provide a blood sample.
3. State-Law Privileges Not "Legally Applicable" to Federal-Question Cases Involving
28 U.S.C. § 1782
In McKevitt v. Pallasch," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted
the part of section 1782(a) that provides that "[a] person may not be compelled to give his
testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally
applicable privilege." 39 In that case, McKevitt was prosecuted in Ireland for membership
in a terrorist organization and sought to obtain tape recordings of interviews that were
made by a group of journalists working on the biography of a key witness for the prose-
cution, David Rupert, as they were allegedly crucial for the cross-examination of Rupert.'14
The journalists who were in possession of the tapes refused to hand them over. First, the
journalists sought to rely on a federal common law reporter's privilege rooted in the First
135. 216 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
136. Id. at 279.
137. Id. (citing In reMetallgesellschaft, 121 F.3d at 79, on the issue of foreign discoverability as a requirement
in the Second Circuit).
138. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 7782(a) (2003).
140. 339 F.3d at 531.
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Amendment. The Seventh Circuit recognized the existence of the privilege, but noted that
its purpose was to maintain the confidentiality of the reporter's source, which was not the
case here since the identity of the source, Rupert, was known. Second, the reporters tried
to claim a statutory version of the privilege enacted by Illinois. The court, however, ruled
that for the purposes of federal-question cases involving section 1782 orders, state-law
privileges were not "legally applicable" privileges. In the end, the Seventh Circuit ordered
the production of the tape recordings for use in the Irish trial.
C. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
1. Non-Party New York Law Firm to Produce Documents Located in its New York Office
and Belonging to Dutch Client
In Ratliff v. Davis Polk & Wardwell,141 the Second Circuit recently reversed and remanded
an order of the Southern District of New York in which the district court denied a motion
to compel a non-party to comply with a subpoena to produce documents in its possession.
The documents requested belonged to a Dutch company and had come under Davis
Polk's control during its representation of the company in connection with an SEC
investigation.
Relying on its decision in In re Sarrio, S.A., 142 the Second Circuit held that because the
documents had previously been disclosed to the SEC and had thereby lost their protection
under attorney-client privilege, strong policy considerations favored full and complete dis-
covery. 143 As the court put it: "[D]ocuments held by an attorney in the United States on
behalf of a foreign client, absent privilege, are as susceptible to subpoena as those stored in
a warehouse within the district court's jurisdiction. Documents obtain no special protection
because they are housed in a law firm."'-
2. Request for Judicial Assistance under Hague Convention Granted Notwithstanding
Netherlands' Reservation Against Pre-Trial Discovery
In Tulip Computers International B. V v. Dell Computer Corp., 45 the U.S. District Court for
the District of Delaware granted motions to approve requests for international judicial
assistance to take evidence from two citizens of the Netherlands. In this patent infringement
suit, the court held that it was appropriate for discovery to proceed under the Hague Evi-
dence Convention against two non-party Dutch citizens, formerly employed by Tulip, who
had not voluntarily subjected themselves to discovery and were not otherwise subject to the
district court's jurisdiction.
Tulip opposed Dell's request for letters rogatory on the grounds that the information
sought was privileged and that Dell's requests did not conform with the Netherlands'
reservations with regard to article 2 3 of the Hague Evidence Convention, the well known
exception that permits countries to opt out of providing pretrial discovery. On this issue,
141. 354 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2003).
142. 119 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that "where documents unobtainable by subpoena while in the
possession of the client are transferred to a lawyer to obtain legal advice, making the documents available to
process would defeat the purposes of the attorney-client privilege").
143. Ratliff, 354 F.3d at 167.
144. Id. at 170-71.
145. 254 F. Supp. 2d 469 (D. Del. 2003).
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the district court found that Tulip's arguments spoke only to the scope of the discovery
sought, not to Dell's right to seek the discovery pursuant to the Hague Evidence
Convention.'46
The Court reasoned that proceeding under the Hague Evidence Convention was appro-
priate since Tulip's former employees: (1) were Dutch citizens; (2) were not parties to the
lawsuit; (3) had not voluntarily subjected themselves to discovery; and (4) were not otherwise
subject to the Court's jurisdiction. As to the scope of the discovery, the court explained that
the judicial authorities in the Netherlands would narrow the request if they found it over-
broad pursuant to the Netherlands' article 23 reservations.
VI. Developments in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
ANDREW B. LOEWENSTEIN*
A. THE FSIA AND AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES OF FOREIGN STATES
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) governs the amenability of foreign sov-
ereigns to suit in the courts of the United States.147 The most significant development in
FSIA jurisprudence in 2003 was the Supreme Court's decision in Dole Food Co. v. Patrick-
son.148 There, the Supreme Court resolved two issues, both of which concern "agencies and
instrumentalities" of foreign states. 49 Under the FSIA, agencies and instrumentalities of
foreign states, such as state-owned corporations, are accorded the same immunity as be-
stowed upon foreign states.
First, Dole resolved a circuit split over whether entities owned by agencies or instrumen-
talities of foreign states-a structure known as "tiering"-are themselves entitled to im-
munity under the FSIA.5 0 Dole commenced as an action filed by foreign farm workers in a
Hawaiian state court, which was removed to federal court by two impleaded Israeli com-
panies whose ultimate parent was the State of Israel.' The issue in Dole was whether the
146. Id. at 474. The Court indicated that it was not convinced by Tulip's assertions with regard to the
Netherlands reservations pursuant to article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention as it applied to Dell's
proposed document requests. It held that the "emerging view" of the Netherlands reservation is that it "applies
only to 'requests that lack sufficient specificity or that have not been reviewed for relevancy by the requesting
court.... ,"' (quoting Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 564 (1987)). Tulip Computers, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 474-75.
*Andrew B. Loewenstein is an attorney with the litigation and international practice groups of Foley Hoag
LLP in Boston, MA.
147. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2003).
148. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2003). An agency or instrumentality is defined as "any entity" which "isaseparate
legal person, corporate otherwise," which is "an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,"
and which "is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor created under the laws of any third
country." Id. § 1603(b).
150. Compare Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) (subsidiaries of tiered, foreign state-
owned corporations are not entitled to immunity under the FSIA), with In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn,
Ind., 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996) (the FSIA grants immunity to subsidiaries of foreign state-owned corpora-
tions).
151. Dole, 538 U.S. at 468-69.
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removal was proper in light of the fact that the Israeli companies were not directly owned
by the Israeli government, but rather through intermediate corporations. In a 7-2 decision,
the Court held that an entity is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state only if the
foreign state itself owns a majority of the entity's shares. Noting that the FSIA's definition
of an agency or instrumentality can be an entity "a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,"' 2 the Court
stated that whether an entity is "owned" by a foreign state must be determined with respect
to the "basic tenet of American corporate law" that a corporation is distinct from its share-
holders.15 Thus, where a foreign sovereign owns a majority of shares in a corporate tier
above the litigant, the foreign sovereign does not "own" the litigant, at least as that term
is properly construed in American corporate law. Therefore, entities whose parents are
corporations which are themselves owned by a foreign sovereign, like the Israeli companies
at issue in Dole, do not qualify for immunity under the FSIA.
Second, the Court considered whether an entity's status under the FSIA should be de-
termined as of the time an alleged tort or other actionable wrong occurred, or at the time
the suit is filed. The Court unanimously held that this determination should be made at
the time the complaint is filed.
B. ORGANS OF FOREIGN STATES
One consequence of Dole's holding that subsidiaries of state-owned corporations are not
entitled to immunity because they are not agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states, is
that it is now more important for such entities to try to establish entitlement to immunity
by showing themselves to be "organs" of foreign states. 54
In USX Corp. v. Adriatic Insurance Co.,' the Third Circuit adopted the non-determinative
list of factors previously used by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits to determine whether an
entity is an organ of a foreign state, namely: (1) the circumstances surrounding the entity's
creation; (2) the purpose of its activities; (3) the degree of supervision by the government;
(4) the level of government financial support; (5) the entity's employment policies, particu-
larly regarding whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays
their salaries; and (6) the entity's obligations and privileges under the foreign state's laws.
In addition, the Third Circuit supplemented this list with another factor: "the ownership
structure of the entity."'15 6 In EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., the
Ninth Circuit emphasized that an entity does not need to satisfy all of the listed factors to
qualify as an organ of a foreign state, noting that, for instance, "[a] company may be an
organ of a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA even if its employees are not civil
servants."' 57
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (a) (2003).
153. Dole, 538 U.S. at 474.
154. See EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., 322 F.3d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 2003)
("Either the entity can be an 'organ' of a foreign state,' or the entity can have a majority of its shares or other
ownership interest owned by a 'foreign state or a political subdivision thereof.'") (internal quotations omitted).
155. 345 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2003).
156. Id.
157. 322 F.3d at 641.
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C. EXCEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Under the FSIA, foreign sovereigns are presumptively immune from suit in federal courts
absent the applicability of one of the statute's enumerated exceptions to immunity. In 2003,
federal courts considered cases involving the waiver, commercial activity, expropriation,
tortious activity, and terrorism exceptions to sovereign immunity.
1. Waiver Exception
Under the FSIA's waiver exception, a foreign sovereign is not immune from suit in actions
where the sovereign explicitly or implicitly waives its immunity. Courts generally find im-
plicit waivers of immunity in only three circumstances: where a foreign state agrees to
arbitration in another country; where a foreign state agrees that a contract is governed by
the laws of a particular country; and where the foreign state files a responsive pleading
without raising the immunity defense. The implicit waiver exception to immunity is nar-
rowly construed, and courts generally require strong evidence that the foreign state in-
tended to waive its immunity.
In 2003, courts considered claims by plaintiffs that foreign state defendants had waived
immunity both explicitly and implicitly. In Elixir Shipping, Ltd. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara,"51 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had implicitly
waived its immunity by filing suit in Singapore. The District Court for the Southern District
of Texas held that this allegation was insufficient to support a finding that the foreign state
defendant had implicitly waived immunity under the FSIA. Elixir thus followed the rule
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Corzo v. Banco Central De Reserva delPeru"59 that a foreign
state's submission to its own courts or to the courts of a country other than the United
States is not, by itself, sufficient evidence of the sovereign's intent to waive immunity from
suit in the United States. The court distinguished situations where a foreign sovereign that
is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards has agreed to arbitration in another signatory of that Convention,
since the Convention contemplates enforcement in other signatory states, including the
United States.
In Atlantic Tele-Network Inc. v. Inter-American Development Bank,16 the plaintiff sought to
obtain federal jurisdiction over the Republic of Guyana on the basis of an alleged explicit
waiver of immunity.'6 ' To that end, the plaintiff cited Guyana's execution of a contract
which stated that "[t]he Government agrees to waive any defense of sovereign immunity
and consents to suit, if necessary, to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation of this
Agreement."' 62 The District Court for the District of Columbia, however, found this lan-
guage insufficient to explicitly waive immunity under the FSIA. Noting that "language
purporting to effect a waiver of immunity should be construed narrowly,"' 16 the court held
that the waiver language in the contract gave "no intimation" that Guyana had contem-
plated being sued in the United States. To the contrary, the court cited other provisions of
the contract establishing the laws of Guyana as governing the contract and a forum selection
158. 267 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
159. 243 F.3d 519, 523-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
160. 251 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2003).
161. The author served as counsel to the Government of Guyana in the Atlantic Tele-Network litigation.
162. Atlantic, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 133.
163. Id.
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clause selecting the courts of Guyana to resolve disputes as strongly, suggesting that the
foreign sovereign had not intended to waive its immunity from suit in the United States.
In Gulf Resources America v. Republic of Congo,164 the plaintiff alleged that the Congo had
explicitly waived its immunity in the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of Congo Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, wherein Congo consented to the submission of investment disputes to the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The Court re-
jected this argument because, inter alia, the treaty's only effect was to offer the plaintiff the
right to compel arbitration before ICSID, not the right to proceed with its claims in federal
court. In addition, the court rejected the plaintiff's alternative argument that Congo had
implicitly waived its immunity with respect to the plaintiff by agreeing to a limited waiver
of immunity in contracts with parties other than the plaintiff. Given that the agreements
were not signed contemporaneously and did not appear to have been perceived as a "com-
plete package," the court rejected the argument that the "interrelated nature" of these
contracts supported a finding of waiver of immunity even absent express incorporation
language.
Anderman v. Federal Republic ofAustriala6 also addressed explicit waivers of immunity. In
that case, the court held that Austria did not explicitly waive its immunity in a treaty that
the plaintiff maintained had a "structure and history" which supported such a finding. The
court held that "[e]xplicit waivers may be ascertained simply by reading the document in
which an explicit waiver is purportedly made," and that if it is "necessary to refer to the
'structure and history"' of a document, "then the waiver is not explicit.' 1 66
In Blaxland v. Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, 167 the Ninth Circuit considered
the rule, articulated in Siderman de Blake v. Republic ofArgentina,168 that a foreign sovereign's
use of U.S. courts can trigger an implicit waiver of immunity. The Blaxland court explained
that in Siderman, the Argentine government had imprisoned the plaintiff, and upon his
release and escape to the United States, the government "continued to persecute him by
bringing a bogus fraud action in an Argentine court,"'169 and then filed a letter rogatory
with a California state court requesting assistance in serving the plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit
observed that, in such situations, since "Argentina ha[d] engaged our courts in the very
course of activity for which the [plaintiff] seek[s] redress, it ha[d] waived immunity as to
that redress."70 The Ninth Circuit distinguished the use of the courts in Siderman from
the extradition request at issue in Blaxland, finding that the latter entailed "a diplomatic
process carried out through the powers of the executive, not the judicial, branch."'' Ac-
cording to the court, "all extradition-related judicial proceedings are initiated and con-
ducted by the U.S. Department of Justice," which acts "on behalf of the foreign sovereign,"
and as a result, the foreign sovereign itself "makes no direct request of our courts, and its
contacts with the judiciary are mediated by the executive branch."' 72
164. 276 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003).
165. 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
166. Id. at 1106.
167. 323 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003).
168. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
169. Blaxland, 323 F.3d at 1206.
170. Id. (citing Siderman, 965 F.2d at 722).
171. 323 F.3d at 1207.
172. Id.
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2. The Commercial Activity Exception
The most frequently invoked exception to immunity under the FSIA is the commercial
activity exception. The first clause of the commercial activity exception permits federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in circumstances where the claim is
based on a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state. The
second clause allows jurisdiction where the claim is based upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere. Fi-
nally, the third clause of the commercial activity exception gives courts jurisdiction over
claims based upon acts outside the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that causes direct effects in the United States.
In Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 173 the plaintiff argued that the alleged expropriation
of his land by the government of Pakistan had a direct effect in the United States sufficient
to permit removal of Pakistan's immunity. The Eleventh Circuit identified the key issue as
being whether the Pakistani government engaged in a commercial activity. The court noted
that the "touchstone for determining if a foreign government's act is commercial is whether
the nature of the act is public or private."'174 A government's regulation of the market, use
of police power, or other activities requiring state authority are not commercial; accordingly,
the court held that the Pakistani government exercised the power of eminent domain and
thus its conduct was not commercial. In this respect, the Eleventh Circuit recognized a
narrow disagreement with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina,'75 in which that court noted that an expropriation may fall within the third clause
of the commercial activity exception, depending on the government's use of the expropri-
ated property post-expropriation, i.e. whether the property was then used for commercial
purposes. The Beg court "decline[d] to examine the government's motives in determining
what is commercial activity."
176
By contrast, in Anderman v. Federal Republic ofAustria,t'I the District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California held that Austria's acquisition of stocks and bonds of American
companies during the Second World War and transfer of ownership to itself or exchange
for other property, permitted jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception's first
clause.
As noted, under the third clause of the commercial activity exception, a foreign sovereign
is not immune from suit where the claim is based on an act outside the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state that causes a direct effect in the
United States. In this connection, there is a split in the authorities over what qualifies as a
direct effect in the United States. On the one hand, in the Second, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits, a commercial activity outside the United States is considered to have a direct effect
in the United States only if the effect is "legally significant."'78 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit,
although not expressly adopting the legal significance test, holds that a plaintiff's financial
173. 353 F.3d 1323 (llth Cir. 2003).
174. Id. at 1325.
175. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 708-11 (9th Cir. 1992).
176. Beg, 353 F.3d at 1326 n..
177. 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
178. See Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd 504 U.S. 607
(1992); Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997); United World Trade, Inc. v.
Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 1994).
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loss in the United States satisfies the direct effect test only if the foreign sovereign was
obligated to render payment in the United States.' 9 On the other hand, the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits reject the legal significance test, and hold that financial loss by an American plain-
tiff, if an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity, is a direct effect in the United
States.8 0
This split continued in 2003. The District Court for the Western District of Michigan
adopted the Fifth Circuit's position that a commercial activity need not cause a legally
significant event in the United States to qualify as a direct effect.18 l On the other hand, in
Filler v. Hanvit Bank,Is2 the district court held that the allegedly wrongful conduct-false
statements made to auditors in Korea that later were allegedly incorporated into audit
reports that were transmitted for eventual use by the plaintiffs in connection with the
acquisition of certain Belgian securities-did not have a "direct effect in the United States,"
where the stocks were received, since the plaintiffs' "financial loss is too remote from the
acts of the Korean banks' in Korea to be considered the 'immediate consequence' of such
acts."1
8 3
Courts in the District of Columbia continued to adhere to the position that a financial
loss is a direct effect in the United States only if there was an obligation to make payment
in the United States.8 4 Thus, in Gulf Resources America v. Republic of Congo,8 5 the district
court held that "[a]dverse impact alone on economic interests in the United States from an
act or omission of a foreign state abroad in a commercial context is insufficient as a matter
of law.., deprive the foreign state of its immunity under section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA."'18 6
Rather, the plaintiff must allege, at a minimum, that "the foreign state itself breached a
duty of its own to the plaintiff that involved an event in the U.S."' 7 In this case, however,
the harm alleged by the plaintiff "entail[ed] no more than an attenuation of plaintiff's
business aspirations in the U.S. and elsewhere, and other courts have held that 'mere fi-
nancial loss by a person-individual or corporate-in the U.S. is not, in itself, sufficient to
constitute' a 'direct effect."' s
Similarly, in BPA International, Inc. v. Kingdom of Sweden, s9 the plaintiffs alleged that the
seizure of their assets in Sweden by entities owned by Sweden fell within the third clause
179. Croesus EMTR Master Fund L.P. v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 212 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37 (D.D.C.
2002); Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Zedan v. Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
180. Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2002); Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp.
v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 897 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
194 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D.NJ. 2002).
181. Tolliver v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 265 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (W.D. Mich. 2003) ("failure to receive
payment in the United States would constitute a direct commercial effect in the United States").
182. 247 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
183. Id. at 429. See also Anderman, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (acquisition of wealth that advances commercial
interests in the United States is not a sufficient "direct effect" in the United States for purposes of the third
clause of the commercial activity exception); Human Rights in China v. Bank of China, No. 02 Civ. 4361(NRB),
2003 VVL 22170648, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2003) (third clause of the commercial activity exception requires
"direct effect" in the United States to be "legally significant").
184. Atlantic Tele-Network, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 134 ("In this jurisdiction, the direct effect test is interpreted
to require a clause in a contract mandating the fulfillment of contractual obligations in the United States").
185. 276 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003).
186. Id. at 27.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1997)).
189. 281 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2003).
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of the FSIA's commercial activity exception by virtue of having a "direct effect in the United
States by diminishing the value of assets owned by BPA International, Inc. and harming its
ability to earn a profit."190 The district court rejected that argument on the ground that a
"financial loss in the United States, when all the acts giving rise to the claim occurred
outside this country, is insufficient to show the 'direct effect' in the United States that FSIA
requires."191
Likewise, in Global Index, Inc. v. Mkapa,192 the plaintiff filed suit against senior officials
of the Government of Tanzania and sought to establish a "direct effect" in the United States
by virtue of alleged non-payment of certain promissory notes. 93 Noting there can be "no
direct effect unless payment was 'supposed' to have been made in the United States," the
court held that the "plaintiff does not show that payment was 'supposed' to be made in
the United States, expressly or not."' Nor, the court held, is there a direct effect "if the
creditor-plaintiff chooses, unilaterally, the U.S. as a place of payment without any prior
agreement with the debtor."' 9'
3. EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION
Under the FSIA's expropriation exception to sovereign immunity:
[Federal courts have jurisdiction over cases] in which rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property
is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such property
is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.
196
In Anderman v. Federal Republic ofAustria,197 the district court rejected Austria's argument
that the FSIA's expropriation exception was not applicable because the government's alleged
seizure of property during the Second World War was undertaken while Austria was under
Nazi occupation. The court held that at the jurisdictional stage, the plaintiff needs only to
state a substantial and nonfrivolous claim to establish jurisdiction. Moreover, "the foreign
state against whom a claim is made need not be the sovereign that expropriated the property
at issue." 198
Having crossed this threshold issue, the court addressed the plaintiffs' argument that they
had established jurisdiction under the first clause of the FSIA's expropriation exception,
which provides for jurisdiction where property in the United States is used in connection
with a commercial activity carried on in the United States. The plaintiffs contended that
they had satisfied the first clause because they alleged that the property expropriated by
Austria had been exchanged for cash, foreign currency, and securities in U.S. corporations
190. Id. at 81.
191. Id.
192. 290 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2003).
193. The author's law firm represented the Tanzanian officials in this matter.
194. Global Index, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 113-14.
195. Id. at 115.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
197. 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
198. Id. at 1109.
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and financial institutions. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that many of the expropriated
securities were issued by American businesses and institutions. The court rejected these
arguments for establishing jurisdiction based on the first clause of the expropriation excep-
tion, since even if the allegations were true, the plaintiffs had not alleged that "the property
is in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on here," as that
clause requires. 99
4. Tortious Activity Exception
Under the FSIA's tortious activity exception to sovereign immunity:
[Federal courts have jurisdiction over claims in which] money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official
or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment.3°
This exception, however, extends only to non-discretionary torts, and does not apply to
"any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused." 1o In Simons v. Lycee
Francais de New York,2°2 the court ruled that the plaintiff's claim that the French Consulate
ignored or was unresponsive to the plaintiff's alleged problems while attending a French
school "involved the alleged exercise or failure to exercise discretionary functions," and as
a consequence did not fall within the FSIA's tortious activity exception. 03
In Blaxiand v. Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions ,04 the Ninth Circuit held that
allegations of malicious prosecution and abuse of process do not fall with the tortious
activity exception since 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B) expressly prohibits the exception from
applying to, inter alia, claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Moreover,
the court ruled that because the plaintiff's claims for emotional distress and loss of con-
sortium arise from the same corpus of allegations as the malicious prosecution and abuse
of process claims, these claims are likewise barred. In addition, the court held that the
plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment, based on his detention by U.S. law enforcement
authorities acting on Australia's request, although a recognized tort under the tortious
activity exception, did not give rise to jurisdiction in this case since the plaintiff's action
was against Australian governmental entities (not against the United States) and thus was
in actuality an impermissible claim for malicious prosecution or abuse of process rather
than for false imprisonment.
5. Terrorism Exception
In 1996, Congress amended the FSIA by creating an additional exception to foreign
sovereign immunity for countries designated by the State Department under section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 as sponsors of terrorism, if the countries in question
either committed a terrorist act resulting in the death or personal injury of a U.S. national,
or provided material support and resources to an individual or entity that committed such
a terrorist act.2 05 Later in 1996, Congress enacted the "Flatow Amendment." This amend-
199. Id.
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (2003).
201. Id.
202. No. 03 Civ. 4972(LAK), 2003 WL 22295360 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2003).
203. Id. at *2.
204. Blaxand, 323 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003).
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ment attempted to clarify the potential causes of action permitted under the FSIA's ter-
rorism exception. Although a number of courts had construed the Flatow Amendment as
permitting causes of actions against foreign states themselves, in 2003 the D.C. Circuit
Court in Roederv. Islamic Republic ofIran observed that "[i]n view of the Flatow amendment's
failure to mention the liability of foreign states, it is 'far from clear' that a plaintiff has a
substantive claim against a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
'2 06
Although the D.C. Circuit Court declined to decide the issue in Roeder, at the beginning
of 2004 it definitively held that no private cause of action has been created. 0 7 In 2003,
however, a number of district courts held that the Flatow Amendment does provide a cause
of action against foreign states, although most of these decisions were in the D.C. Circuit
Court. 08
D. SERVICE
In 2003, two cases addressed the FSIA's service requirements. In BPA International, Inc.
v. Kingdom of Sweden,209 the plaintiffs did not comply with the source requirements of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 40)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) when they mailed an English
language copy of the summons and complaint to the Swedish embassy in Washington, D.C.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that any defect in service should be excused
because, citing Straub v. A.P Green, Inc.,21° they had substantially complied with the re-
quirements for service under the FSIA and because Sweden had actual notice. The court
distinguished Straub on the ground that the case there involved service on an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b), whereas the case at hand
involved service on a foreign sovereign under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). The court concluded
that when making service on a foreign sovereign, the requirements of section 1608(a) must
be strictly followed.
In Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corp.,'"1 the plaintiff's service on
an agency or instrumentality of Nigeria was not in strict compliance with the requirements
of section 1608(b). The district court, however, following the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Magness v. Russian Federation,"2 applied a "substantial compliance" test whereby actual no-
tice of the suit overrides "technical deficiencies in service."2 3 In this case, the defendant
argued that because service was effectuated only on the general manager for its corporate
secretariat and legal division-and not on either its chairman or managing director-the
defendant could not have had the requisite actual notice. The court rejected this argument,
holding that the service was sufficient to create actual notice.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2004).
206. 333 F.3d 228, 234 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
207. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1033 (D.C. Cit. 2004).
208. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 274 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2003); Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Kerr v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 245 F. Supp.
2d 59, 63 n.9 (D.D.C. 2003); Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 194 (D.D.C. 2003)
("plaintiffs have a cause of action against Iran"); Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 37 (D.D.C.
2003) ("the Flatow Amendment does provide victims of state-sponsored acts of terrorism with a cause of action
against the culpable foreign state"); Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2003).
209. 281 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2003).
210. 38 F.3d 448, 453 (9th Cit. 1994).
211. 288 F. Supp. 2d 783 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
212. 247 F.3d 609, 616-17 (5th Cir. 2001).
213. GulfPetro, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
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E. DEFAULT
The FSIA states that a court shall not enter a default judgment against a foreign state
"unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court. 21 4 In 2003, a district court in the District of Columbia followed precedents requiring
plaintiffs to prove their right to relief by clear and convincing evidence."' Conversely, in
Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a district court in the Southern District of New York
followed an alternative view, articulated in Ungar v. Islamic Republic oflran,2I6 that the proper
standard for a default judgment is "the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)-a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
find for plaintiff."17 Thus, in Smith, the court applied a less demanding standard that
requires only the presentation of legally sufficient evidence for a jury to find for the plaintiff.
In addition, in Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a district court in the District of
Columbia reaffirmed the rule that "[i]n evaluating the plaintiff's proof, the court may 'ac-
cept as true the plaintiff's uncontroverted evidence."2 In such default proceedings, the
plaintiff may establish proof by affidavit. However, the court is not permitted to suspend
the rules of evidence in an inquest on damages pursuant to section 1608(e).1' 9
F. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FSIA
In 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Republic of Austria v. Altmann2 0 to
address whether the expropriation exception of the FSIA affords jurisdiction over claims
against foreign states based on conduct that occurred before the United States adopted the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 1952. A decision is expected in 2004.
VII. Developments in the Act of State Doctrine
CATHERINE AMIRFAR*
A. INTRODUCTION
In its traditional formulation, the Act of State Doctrine (Doctrine) "precludes the courts
of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory." '' The policies underlying the doc-
trine include international comity, respect for sovereignty of foreign nations on their own
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2004).
215. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1998)).
216. 211 F. Supp. 2d 91, 98 (D.D.C. 2002).
217. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
218. 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97,
100 (D.D.C. 2000)).
219. Id. at 268 (citing Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2002)); Smith,
262 F. Supp. 2d at 224 ("Although affidavits are generally inadmissible at trial, they may be used in hearings
pursuant to § 1608(e)").
220. 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3202, 72 U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2003)
(NO. 03-13).
*Catherine Amirfar is an attorney at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, New York.
221. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
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territory, and concerns for the domestic separation of powers. At its core, the Doctrine
reflects "the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing
on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder" the conduct of foreign affairs by the
Executive Branch. 221 Of course, not all foreign sovereign acts are immune from judicial
scrutiny. Under the current view the doctrine is applicable only if the relief sought or the
defense interposed in an action would require a court in the United States to declare invalid
the foreign sovereign's official act.223
The Doctrine is not one of abstention. Instead, it is a binding rule of decision. Once
invoked, it deems the act of a foreign sovereign within its own boundaries as valid in U.S.
courts.2 4 The burden of proof of the applicability of the Doctrine rests with the party
attempting to invoke it as a basis for dismissing the action.22
B. EXISTENCE OF CLEARLY DEFINED, CONTROLLING LEGAL PRINCIPLES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In 2003,jus cogens violations were distinguished from other human rights violations with
regard to the applicability of the Doctrine. In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc.,226 the District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the
Doctrine could not be used as a defense against claims alleging acts of torture, enslavement,
war crimes, and genocide by the Sudanese government acting in concert with a Canadian
energy company to facilitate oil exploration activities. The plaintiffs, a class of Sudanese,
non-Muslim residents living within fifty miles of the oil concession areas, alleged that the
energy company conspired with the Sudanese government to institute a campaign of ethnic
cleansing against the local non-Muslim population in an effort to depopulate areas around
oil concessions thereby promoting oil development.
While acknowledging that the Doctrine generally can apply to human rights violations,
the court held that because the alleged acts-genocide, war crimes, enslavement and torture-
constitute violations of universally-recognized, orjus cogens, norms of international law, they
necessarily are tantamount to invalid acts of state and the Doctrine cannot apply as a matter
of course. In distinguishingjus cogens norms from other human rights violations for which
the Doctrine has been found to apply, the court cited to the Supreme Court's decision in
Sabbatinoz7 for the general principle that the more clear-cut the violation of international
law, the less deference is due to the acts of a foreign sovereign.
Likewise, in United States v. Labs of Virginia, Inc.,22o a district court in the Northern
District of Illinois found that where a treaty clearly defines the controlling international
law relevant to the disposition of a case, the Doctrine does not bar claims concerning the
222. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990) (quoting Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 423).
223. See id. See also Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. New Zealand Dairy Bd., 942 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), on
reargument, 954 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Credit Suisse v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 130
F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1997).
224. See W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406. See also World Wide Minerals v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296
F.3d 1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
225. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 344-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
226. Id. at 289.
227. Id. at 344 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401).
228. 272 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Il1. 2003).
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foreign sovereign's public acts. Invoking the so-called "treaty exception" to the Doctrine,
the court found that the relevant treaty to which both the United States and Indonesia are
parties provided unambiguous legal principles directly governing certain export decisions
made by the Indonesian government.
C. IMPACT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
The existence of sensitive negotiations between the United States and a foreign sovereign
does not, without more, require dismissal pursuant to the Doctrine. In Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., again, the court found that the existence of U.S. diplomatic
efforts around the issue of human rights in Sudan, including a pending Congressional bill,
did not militate in favor of dismissal because the diplomatic relations consisted of condem-
nations of the acts of the Sudanese government, including some of the acts at issue in the
suit. The court reasoned that in light of the extensive condemnations already expressed
through political channels, any criticism of Sudan that would arise as a result of the adju-
dication of the case would be insignificant. In another 2003 case, a district court declined
to apply the Doctrine based on the need to avoid embarrassment to the executive branch
where the case was an enforcement action brought by the executive branch itself based upon
existing treaty obligations between the countries. In those circumstances, the court rea-
soned, there was simply no possibility of embarrassing the executive branch.
D. IMPLICATION IN LITIGATION BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES
In 2003, a court found that the Doctrine does not apply to the private commercial acts
of an individual where no sufficient nexus exists between those acts and the public acts of
a foreign sovereign. In Blanchard & Co. v. Barrick Gold Corp.,
229 plaintiffs complained of an
antitrust injury involving a conspiracy between a gold mining company and some private
banks to manipulate the price of gold. The defendants argued that the act of state precluded
the court's adjudication of the claims because the claims created a nexus between the de-
fendants' acts and the acts of a foreign sovereign's national banks. The Eastern District of
Louisiana rejected the defense, finding that although the alleged manipulation of gold prices
involved leasing gold from foreign sovereigns, the sovereigns or their national banks them-
selves were not implicated in the conspiracy. The court did find, however, that one requested
remedy, the termination of all of the defendants' gold contracts, could implicate the con-
tractual obligations of the national banks and, if so, the remedy would have to be precluded
or adjusted pursuant to the Doctrine.
Also in 2003, a federal district court found that in a matter involving the death of Phil-
ippine seamen in a steam boiler explosion on a cruise ship, the employment contracts at
issue were not unconscionable or the result of coercion, in part because the contracts had
been approved by an agency of the Philippine government charged with standardizing
employment contracts for Philippine workers overseas. 30 The court held that the Doctrine
operated as a rule of decision requiring that the court find valid the employment contracts
and the manner in which the Philippine workers entered into them. Likewise, in Lyondell-
Citgo Refining v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., the Southern District of New York found that
229. No. Civ.A. 02-3721, 2003 VL 22071173, *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 3, 2003).
230. See Bautista v. Star Cruises, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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the Doctrine precluded the plaintiff oil company from asserting as a basis for its breach of
contract claim that a directive by the Venezuelan national oil authority was invalid 13
VIII. Developments in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
KRISTEN BOON AND LADA SOLJAN*
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to succeed on a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, a
defendant must establish that the foreign forum is adequate and that the private and public
factors set out in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert weigh in favor of dismissal.32 The most important
developments in 2003 involve the determination of the adequacy of the foreign forum,
particularly as regards: (1) the burden of proof requirements; (2) factors demonstrating
inadequacy; and (3) the corresponding impact on claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA).
B. ADEQUACY OF THE FOREIGN FORUM AND THE NEED FOR A DETAILED RECORD
The threshold for determining the adequacy of a foreign forum typically has been low,
which indicates a predisposition towards a finding of adequacy: "[An alternative forum is
adequate if the defendants are amenable to service of process there, and if it permits liti-
gation of the subject matter of the dispute."233 Recently, however, courts have given con-
flicting signals about the level of evidence required on the issue. Because the defendant
bears the burden of proof on a forum non conveniens application, it must marshal the facts
and not merely suggest why a different forum is more appropriate.3 4 The amount of evi-
dence the defendant must show depends upon the case, with more required if the plaintiff
controverts the defendant's evidence.3" On the other hand, defendants who submit too
much evidence may undercut their assertion that it is inconvenient to try the case in the
plaintiff's chosen forum."' In this vein, the Southern District of New York has recently
followed a decision in the Eleventh Circuit in finding that defendants have the ultimate
231. No. 02 Civ. 0795, 2003 WL 21878798, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2003).
*Kristen Boon is Legal Officer, UN, Human Rights and Economic Law Division, Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs. Lada Soljan is Associate, Alston & Bird, LLP, New York, New York. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the authors.
232. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
254 n.22 (1981). Private interest factors include: the relative ease of access to sources of proof; the availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wimesses; the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witness;
the possibility of viewing subject premises (if appropriate to the action); and other practical concerns making
trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive (e.g., the ability to implead third-party defendants, the enforceability ofjudgment if one is obtained, etc.). Public interest factors include: the administrative difficulties flowing from
court congestion; the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty; the local interest
in having localized controversies decided at home; the trial in a forum familiar with governing law; and the
avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of law.
233. Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir. 2003).
234. Hsu v. Oz Optics Ltd., 211 F.R.D. 615, 618 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
235. See, e.g., Mutambara v. Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 02-0827, 2003 WL 1846083 (D.D.C. Mar.
24. 2003).
236. Ford v. Brown, 319 F. 3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003).
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burden of persuasion on the adequacy of the foreign forum, but only where the plaintiff
has substantiated his or her allegations of serious corruption or delay.2"
7
C. REVIEW OF FOREIGN REMEDIES: FAIRNESS AND AVAILABILITY
Courts in the United States are generally hesitant to assess the quality of judicial admin-
istration in the foreign forum or differences in substantive law and in the administration of
foreign judicial systems in making a forum non conveniens determination. 38 Nonetheless,
recent cases have shown two new factors that have been added to some courts' consideration
of the inadequacy determination. First, some courts have been persuaded by issues of fair-
ness related to the quality of judicial administration: "A foreign forum is adequate when
the parties will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly, even though they may
not enjoy the same benefits as they might receive in an American court."5 9 Consequently,
inadequacy may be established where the courts of another country are technically open,
but are deemed to be corrupt, poorly funded, or cannot be relied upon to produce a reliable
result.214 Thus, in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, where plaintiffs alleged that Pfizer conducted bio-
medical testing on Nigerian children without informed consent, the Second Circuit found
that "if the plaintiff shows that conditions in the foreign forum plainly demonstrate that
'plaintiffs are highly unlikely to obtain justice therein,' a defendant's forum non conveniens
motion must be denied.
241
Second, while the quantum of remedies continues to be accorded little to no weight in
the adequacy analysis, 242 the nature of the remedies may be assessed. Thus, in Nemariam v.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court'sforum non conveniens determination, finding that an international
commission established to adjudicate claims asserted by two foreign governments on behalf
of their people due to damages resulting from Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict was not
an adequate alternative forum because "even if [the plaintiff's] claim is valid, she has no
personal right to a remedy from the Commission.
2 43
237. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, No. 01 8118, 2002 WL 31082956 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002), vacated on othergrounds
2003 WL 22317923, at *2 (2d Cit. Oct. 8, 2003), citing Leon v. Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1312 (1 lth
Cir.2001) (Newman J., sitting by designation).
238. Satz v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 244 F. 3d 1279, 1283 (2001); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d
1116,1170 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
239. Martinez v. Dow Chemical Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. La. 2002); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cit. 2000); Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir.
2003).
240. See, e.g., Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 719. There, plaintiffs from Honduras and the Philippines claimed
they had been rendered sterile by a chemical produced by the manufacturer defendants in these regions of the
world. The court found both the foreign forums inadequate, referring to the Honduran judiciary as "poorly
staffed and equipped, often ineffective, and subject to outside influence," and also stating that "[wlhile the
Government respects constitutional provisions in principle, implementation has been weak and uneven in
practice." Id. at 737. But see Realuyo v. Villa Alville, 01 Civ. 10158, 2003 WL 21537754 (S.D.N.Y. July 8,
2003) (finding that Philippines was an adequate and available forum and that none of its alleged problems rose
to the level of rendering it inadequate).
241. Abdullahi, 2003 WL 22317923, at *2 (2d Cit. Oct. 8, 2003) (citations omitted).
242. See Kristen Boon, International Legal Developments in Review: 2002 Business Transactions and Disputes,
International Litigation, Developments in the Doctrine of Foreign Non Conveniens, 37 INrr'L LAw. 479, 497 (2003).
243. Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 315 F.3d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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D. FORUM NON CoNVENIENs CLASS ACTIONS UNDER THE ATCA
Since the 1980 Second Circuit decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,244 holding that the
ATCA214 provides a cause of action in the United States for violations of international law,
plaintiffs have brought numerous actions in the United States district courts for human
rights violations246 and environmental torts committed abroad.247 Although no clear stan-
dard has evolved, the Second Circuit's 2003 decision in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.
suggests that emerging tighter standards for ACTA claims may weaken the link with theforum non conveniens doctrine.24 The court dismissed a lawsuit by a group of Peruvian
plaintiffs against a U.S. corporation for poisoning they allegedly suffered due to the defen-
dant's copper smelting operations in Peru. Although the court rested its dismissal on the
plaintiffs' failure to establish an international legal norm that had been breached, several
times in its decision the Second Circuit noted the district court's finding that "even if
plaintiffs had pleaded a violation of customary international law, dismissal on the ground
offorum non conveniens would have been appropriate, '"2 49 indicating, at least implicitly, that
Peru would been an adequate forum for those claims.5o
IX. Extraterritorial Application of United States Law
VINCENT CHIRICO*
A. INTRODUCTION
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law is governed by the principles set forth in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, which permit a state to exercise prescriptive
244. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
245. 20 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). This statute provides that "[the district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."
246. See Zhou v. Peng, No. 00 Civ. 6446, 2003 WL 22251217 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2003); Odah v. UnitedStates, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 534 (U.S.2003); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74
F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996) (recognizing claims of torture as a cause of action covered by the ATCA); In re Estate
of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (alleging torture and other abuses by former President of
Philippines); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (alleging terrorism claims
against Libya based on armed attack upon civilian bus in Israel); Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-
56628, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated, 2003 WL 359787
(9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003).
247. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing an ATCA class action against
Texaco for environmental damage caused in Peru and Ecuador); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (dismissed on the grounds that plaintiffs did not establish the existence of a customary
international law right to life and health, but noting that dismissal would still have been appropriate on the
basis offrum non conveniens). See also Sarah C. Rispin, Litigating Foreign Environmental Claims in U.S. Courts:
The Impact of Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation, ENv. LAw REP. vol. XXXIV (Jan. 2004).
248. Flores, 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
249. ld. at 145, citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
250. See Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 470 (general allegations of corruption and the absence of the class action
device did not render Ecuador an inadequate alternative forum). But see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp.
2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (forum non conveniens motion denied under the political question doctrine).Wincent Chirico is an attorney at Harris Beach, LLP, where he practices complex products liability litigation.
Mr. Chirico is also an adjunct professor of Legal Writing and Appellate Advocacy at New York Law School.
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jurisdiction where the conduct in question "has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory."25s This determination requires a court to weigh several domestic and
foreign considerations. Domestic considerations include the nature of the specific law at
issue in a given case, congressional intent in establishing that law and constitutional limi-
tations.252 Foreign considerations include issues of comity and fairness.
Specifically, a court seeking to apply a given law extraterritorially must consider the
following factors: (1) the extent of the domestic effect; (2) the connections between the
state and the persons engaging in the conduct in question who intend to be protected;
(3) the character of the conduct and the extent to which it is regulated elsewhere; (4) the
degree to which justified expectations would be protected; (5) the importance of the regu-
lation internationally; (6) consistency with international custom; (7) the extent of another
state's interests; and (8) whether extraterritorial application would create a conflict with the
laws of a foreign jurisdiction. Over the past year, a number of cases have addressed the issue
of extraterritoriality in various domains, including tax disputes, antitrust and securities ac-
tions, tort claims, intellectual property and disabilities matters.
B. TAx DISPUTES
In European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
2 " the Second Circuit held that the legislative
history of the Patriot Act did not abrogate a rule barring claims in the United States to
enforce foreign tax judgments. The plaintiffs, the European Community and several Eu-
ropean nations, commenced an action in the Eastern District of New York seeking to
recover lost tax revenue resulting from alleged cigarette smuggling and money laundering
in their territories by several tobacco companies. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of these cases, rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that the Patriot Act reflected congressional
intent to allow foreign sovereigns to use the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) to impose liability on the defendants. In so affirming, the court applied
the common law revenue rule, which prohibits the courts of one sovereign from enforcing
final tax judgments or unadjudicated tax claims of other sovereigns. The same result ensued




In Empagran v. E Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd.,2"' plaintiffs, foreign purchasers of vitamin prod-
ucts, sued foreign and domestic corporations under section 1 of the Sherman Act, foreign
antitrust laws, and international law. Plaintiffs alleged a worldwide conspiracy to raise,
stabilize and maintain vitamin prices. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
granted the distributor defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA). The FTAIA provides that
the Sherman Act will not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations
251. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 402-403 (1987).
252. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. 355 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
254. 341 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1075 (2004) (reaching same result).
255. 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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unless the conduct affects trade or commerce in the United States in a reasonably foresee-
able, direct, and substantial manner. In turn, that effect gives rise to a claim under the
Sherman Act.
The District Court held that the phrase "gives rise to a claim" refers to the claim advanced
by the plaintiff in the action before the court. The Court of Appeals disagreed, opting
instead for a more liberal definition that permits actions where the harmful effect on U.S.
commerce must have given rise to a claim by some other private person or entity.5 6tJudge
Karen LeCraft Henderson dissented, interpreting the FTAIA to require that the phrase
"gives rise to a claim" refers to the claim advanced by the plaintiff in the action itself. The
dissent's definition is consistent with holdings in the Fifth Circuit adopting the narrower
interpretation. 57 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to address this disparity among
the Circuits.""
In United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co.,2 9 plaintiff corporations brought an
action under section 2 of the Sherman Act alleging that the defendant chemical companies
attempted to monopolize the market for chemicals used in the manufacture of a tuberculosis
medication. Defendants argued that the alleged misconduct had no reasonably foreseeable
effect on domestic commerce under the FTAIA. The Seventh Circuit agreed and affirmed
the judgment of the Northern District of Illinois. In finding that plaintiffs were producing
a tuberculosis drug for India, the court held that there was no evidence that plaintiffs would
have made any sales in the United States, and that the small amount of the chemical that
was sold in the United States was used as an ingredient to make rocket motors, and not
drugs. As such, the defendants' alleged conduct did not have direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effects on trade or commerce of the drug in the United States. The
court noted that because the extraterritorial scope of domestic antitrust laws affects United
States relations with foreign governments, courts should "tread softly in this area."26°
D. SECURITIES
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Berger,261 the defendant, Berger, was the sole
principal of Manhattan Capital Management (MCM), a Delaware corporation headquar-
tered in New York which served as investment advisor for the Manhattan Investment Fund,
which was organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands and which the defendant
partially owned. The fund was involved in buying and selling short stocks. The Fund's
assets were invested in domestic securities exchanges, and the majority of the assets and
securities were kept in a Bear Stearns account in New York City. After suffering $300 million
in losses between 1996 and 2000, Berger, rather than reporting the losses, created fraudulent
account statements overstating the Fund's net asset value. After revealing Berger's actions,
the SEC brought a civil suit alleging several securities violations. In a subsequent criminal
proceeding, Berger pleaded guilty to securities fraud charges. Based on those charges, the
SEC moved for summary judgment in the civil action, which was granted by the Southern
District of New York.262 Berger appealed. Prior to the criminal sentencing, the defendant
fled the United States and remains a fugitive.
256. Id. at 341.
257. See, e.g., Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
258. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 966 (2003).
259. 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 533 (2003).
260. Id. at 952.
261. 322 F.3d 187, 187-191 (2d Cir. 2003).
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On appeal, the Second Circuit exercised its discretion to determine the appeal in the
interests of judicial economy, largely because Berger's appeal was deemed to be meridess.
In addressing the extraterritorial application of the securities statutes, the court noted:
[Such] jurisdiction exists only when 'substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud were committed
within the United States,' and that the test is met whenever (1) the defendant's activities in
the United States were more than 'merely preparatory to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere
and (2) the 'activities or culpable failures to act within the United States directly caused the
claimed losses.
2 63
Here, the court held that Berger's conduct was more than "merely preparatory" in that he
masterminded and implemented the scheme in the United States, the effects of which
substantially injured investors in the United States.
E. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer,6' plaintiff web site operators
brought an action against a casino owner under the Lanham Act seeking a declaratory
judgment that plaintiffs were entitled to forty-three internet domain names. Although the
casino owner registered its trademark in Monaco, and not in the United States, it promoted
its properties from a New York office. In affirming the Eastern District of Virginia's grant
of summary judgment in the defendant's favor, the Fourth Circuit noted that "commerce"
as defined by the Lanham Act included all commerce that Congress may regulate under
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which extends to foreign trade.
The court held that the casino owner had a protectable interest in its unregistered mark,
which was distinctive and which the plaintiffs had directly and intentionally copied.
In L.A. News Service v. Reuters TV International., Ltd.,26 plaintiff brought a copyright
infringement action against the defendant news service, alleging that two video recordings
depicting portions of the 1992 Los Angeles riots were improperly copied and transmitted
to European and African subscribers of the defendant's service. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the claims. The court agreed that the Copyright Act does not apply extra-
territorially unless the infringing act is completed entirely within the United States and
that such infringing act enabled further exploitation abroad. Noting that this exception is
a narrow one, the court held that the plaintiffs could not recover actual damages for the
overseas effects of the defendants' overseas infringement because they failed to show that
the defendants earned any profits from the infringing acts.
F. TORT CLAIMS
In Alvarez-Machain v. United States ,26 the plaintiff was a Mexican national who appealed
the dismissal of his claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) as well as his claim against a former Mexican policeman under the ATCA. The
claims arose after Mexican nationals, acting on behalf of the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
262. 244 F. Supp. 2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
263. Id. at 193 (internal quotations omitted).
264. 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003), cen. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1052 (2004).
265. 340 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2003).
266. 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003).
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tration, kidnapped the plaintiff from Mexico and transported him to the United States,
where he was tried and acquitted of involvement in a DEA agent's murder. The Ninth
Circuit reversed the Central District of California's dismissal of the FFCA claims and
affirmed the ATCA judgment holding the former policeman liable to plaintiff. The court
first noted that, while certain criminal statutes are applicable to conduct occurring outside
the United States, this extraterritorial application does not automatically give federal law
enforcement officers unlimited authority to violate the territorial sovereignty of a foreign
nation to enforce those laws or to breach international law in doing so. Although DEA
agents possessed felony arrest power, Congress did not intend that power to extend outside
U.S. borders. The court held that the DEA had no authority to effect the plaintiff's arrest
and detention in Mexico, that these acts were arbitrary and in violation of the ATCA, and
that the plaintiff could seek redress in a United States court under the FTCA. In December
2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 67
267. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 821 (2003).
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